APR 23 1979
0879
-2
141378
SHERROD LIB
PERIOD DEPT
E TENN ST UNIV
JOHNSON CITY TN 37601

The Nation.
April 21, 1979 $1

3

DITORIAL

HE PROFITS OF HISTORY

vo weeks ago, we printed a story about erald R. Ford's as yet unpublished mem-rs, *A Time to Heal*. The memoirs' main ews interest was Ford's account of his con-lential meeting with Gen. Alexander aig, at which the possibility of granting en-President Nixon a pardon in ex-ıange for his resignation was raised.

Now the publisher of the memoirs is cry-ıg "infringement," "rip-off," "theft," "foul," c. We reject these epithets. Before we ent to press, our lawyers advised us that ır story was "fair use" under the letter ıd spirit of the copyright act. More rele-ant, the story of the meeting with Haig as precisely the sort of news whose publi-ation is contemplated by the First Amend-ıent's guarantee of a free press. Ford's ttempt to apply a gloss of innocence to a onversation that was of dubious propriety arrants close scrutiny.

A lot of people by now have become jaded ith the spectacle of public officials profit-ng from inside information gathered dur-ng the course of their public service. Who, it might be asked, is ripping off whom? Publishers have a perfect right to ublish such books. But they cannot be naware that the inflated value of these ooks results from the authors' access to ecret documents and meetings attended while on the public payroll. Publishers who eek to exploit news value must accept the isks of the news business. To cry foul ecause *The Nation* printed the news that Gerald Ford expropriated from the public reminds us of that old newshound Walter Burns in *The Front Page* giving star report-er Hildy Johnson a gold watch, then tele-phoning the police: "The son of a bitch stole my watch!"

THE PHONY OIL CRISIS
Peter Deutsch

PUMPING IRAN
Kai Bird

COUNTDOWN TO MELTDOWN
Ira D. Rosen

THE NATO SURCHARGE
Rep. Les Aspin

LITTLE MAGAZINES
Lawrence Grauman Jr.

KICKING THE PETROL HABIT

GASOHOL— A 100-PROOF SOLUTION

FRED J. COOK

For the last eight months, a 1964 Rambler Classic four-door sedan has been tooling around Washington, perking merrily along on alcohol, getting 20 miles to the gallon, and demonstrating to the blind and deaf Carter Administration that there *is* an alternative—that we do not have to be "a pitiful, helpless giant" caught forever in the toils of OPEC-Big Oil blackmail.

The alcohol-fueled old Rambler is the pet visual exhibit of Scott Skylar, for ten years an aide to Senator Jacob Javits specializing in energy problems, and now the Washington director of the National Council for Appropriate Technology. Skylar is one of a growing number of alternative-energy advocates. Theirs is largely a grass-roots movement that insists the Carter Administration's energy policy is as wrongheaded as it can be.

The Carter policy, so often enunciated by Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, runs like this: $1-a-gallon gasoline is to be welcomed because such a high price will force Americans to sacrifice and conserve. Conservation can reduce our oil imports and help lessen their disastrous impact on the international balance of payments and the dollar. And, finally, lifting controls and letting domestic oil prices zoom to the highest world market level would encourage Big Oil to dig more vigorously to develop untapped reserves within our own country.

It has been a high-price policy that could only serve as an incitement to OPEC for

(Continued on Page 432)

ETSU LIBRARY
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS.

SYMPOSIUM COMMENTARY

Belmont, Mass.

It is very hard to understand why you chose to publish a symposium on bilingualism [Sanford Levinson, Carey McWilliams, Benjamin DeMott and Neil Postman, *The Nation*, March 17] without including the opinions of at least one person of Spanish-speaking origin. In addition, some of your articles showed a very unclear understanding of the meaning of the word. To me, bilingualism means the ability of a person to speak two languages fluently. The idea that bilingualism means maintaining a monolingual Spanish-speaking population is a straw man. Nobody seriously advocates that as a long-term policy. A bilingual population speaks *two* languages, and this country would be richer culturally, and perhaps economically, if we had a large bilingual population of *both* Anglo and Hispanic origin. *Susan Furry*

We did commission an article by a "person of Spanish-speaking origin"; unfortunately, his commitments prevented him from meeting our deadline. Consideration was also given to running an article in Spanish, but this idea was ultimately rejected as impractical. As for Ms. Furry's other complaint, we can only say that our symposium presented the terms "monolingualism" and "bilingualism" in their varying facets, as seen from the different perspectives of our symposiasts. *—The Editors*

Klosters, Switzerland

Your symposium on bilingualism is an approach to a problem that concerns us all. As a writer, I have been made particularly aware of the problem by a spate of letters from a high school English class in Miami, Fla., all of them signed with names that were obviously Cuban in origin, all of them written with care and intelligence, in perfectly good English, questioning me about a story they had been assigned to study by their teacher, whose name also must be of Cuban origin. . . .

I have been in Miami recently and have seen how the Cuban refugees have adapted themselves to American life there, in the banks, the shops, behind the desks of hotels and various agencies. Without a thorough acceptance of the English language, none of them could have made the leap from being refugees with a crippling disability to active, acceptable members of the American community. Nobody is asking them to give up their inherited language, as nobody is asking our Nobel Laureate, Isaac B. Singer, to renounce his inherited Yiddish, but for their interests and ours, and in the firm belief in the future enrichment of American literature by the currents their old language will bring to us, I can only add my voice to those writers who claim that our original ideal of a single major language for our country is one we should adhere to. *Irwin Shaw*

Roslyn Heights, N.Y.

In *The Nation*'s symposium on bilingual education, surprisingly no mention is made of this country's incredible history in successfully absorbing non-English-speaking immigrants.

From 1820 to 1965, a total of roughly 43 million people emigrated to this country, of whom 34 million were from non-English-speaking countries. These immigrants, for the most part, faced the additional handicaps of poverty, illiteracy in their own language, no skills and frequently vicious discrimination: handicaps equal to or greater than those faced by today's Hispanics. Yet their children not only learned English but would have spurned the entire concept of bilingualism.

Irving Howe in *World of Our Fathers* relates how immigrant Jews took pride in the Americanization of their children, and never even seriously considered supporting bilingual education.

If this doctrine is allowed to continue and grow, it can lead to ethnic and cultural Balkanization of this country, as well as foster a permanent Hispanic subculture that will be barred from entering the mainstream of American life. *K. J. Rawson*

Princeton, N.J.

Although I share many of Rawson's feelings, there are at least two aspects of his argument that make me wary of embracing it wholeheartedly: (*1*) Since it is basically true that the immigrants referred to by Rawson "spurned" bilingualism, it is not clear how their voluntary embrace of the primacy of English is altogether relevant to those who do *not* necessarily wish to define "Americanization" as including repudiation of initial, non-English languages. (And, incidentally ,couldn't those who fear the hegemony of English point to Howe's book for support, insofar as one theme that runs through the book is a lament for the demise, partly because of "Americanization," of Yiddish ture?)

(*2*) The notion that there is a sir "mainstream of American life" is it open to challenge. Like the linked me phor of a "melting pot," it suggests t minority cultures and traditions are best tributaries of the single domin American culture. The very challe posed by cultural pluralism, though to deny the implications of a sin "mainstream" (in favor, say, of the m aphor of the various "Great Lakes" American culture). Obviously, anyo who *does* wish to enter the domina culture is well advised to learn Engli the argument about bilingualism perhaps the term should be mul monolingualism), however, concer those who have no such wish.

(*3*) Although not raised directly Rawson's letter, one further point worth mentioning: Failure to kn English has not stopped a huge numb of French- German- Japanese- e speakers from becoming well-off in t international economy. While it may jarring to analogize the internal Ame ican economy or polity to the intern tional community, it at least sugges that, just as knowing English does n guarantee economic success, lack of li guistic competence in English need n be fatal. And, of course, one can be co fident that many (if not indeed mos Spanish-speakers *will* wish to lear English because of whatever economi leverage that does bring, but, for rea sons already indicated, this does n adequately confront the problem raise by those who have other preferences. (I may also be relevant to note that an in creasing number of English-speaker are learning Spanish—or Arabic—i response to what *they* see as economi advantages in doing so. Presumably this does not serve as the basis for a re quirement that all present English speakers also learn Spanish.)

Sanford Levinson

The Nation will publish more reader response to the bilingual symposium in next week's issue.

CORRECTION

In the review "Love's Ennui" by Amy Wilentz [*The Nation*, Apr. 7], the publisher of John Wain's *The Pardoner's Tale* was incorrectly cited. The book is published by The Viking Press.

—The Editors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ONTENTS.

Volume 228, No. 15

VER:
itorial:
e Profits of History
king the Petrol Habit:
sohol—A 100-Proof Solution *Fred J. Cook*

ETTERS
3

DITORIALS
9 Big-Oil Bonanza
0 Staying Death *Aryeh Neier*
1 Hanging Bhutto *William E. Smith*
2 *Second Thoughts* *Carey McWilliams*

RTICLES
3 Shortfalls & Windfalls:
The Phony Oil Crisis *Peter Deutsch*
426 Report From the Oilfields:
The Workers' Committees
Are Pumping Iran *Kai Bird*
428 Countdown to Meltdown:
Grace Under Pressure in Harrisburg *Ira D. Rosen*
430 NATO Surcharge:
The 3 Percent Misunderstanding
Representative Les Aspin

BOOKS & THE ARTS
437 Mandel: The Second Slump *David Gordon*
439 Anderson and Kinzie, eds.: The Little
Magazine in America *Lawrence Grauman Jr.*
442 The Anniversary (poem) *Roberta Spear*
444 Theater *Harold Clurman*

Drawings by Lou Myers

litor, Victor Navasky

xecutive Editor, Richard Lingeman; *Literary Editor*, Elizabeth Pochoda; *oetry Editor*, Grace Schulman; *Copy Editor*, Patricia Dowling; *Assistant opy Editor*, Sydne Silverstein; *Assistant Editor*, Kai Bird; *Editorial ssistants*, Karen Wilcox, Amy Wilentz; *Editorial Secretary*, Ola Lyon.

epartments: *Art*, Lawrence Alloway; *Architecture*, Jane Holtz Kay; *Dance*, ancy Goldner; *Films*, Robert Hatch; *Indigenous Music*, Nat Hentoff; *Iusic*, David Hamilton; *Press*, Richard Pollak; *Telerision*, Peter Sourian; *heater*, Harold Clurman; *White House Correspondent*, Robert Sherrill. *'orrespondents*: *Bonn*, C. Amery; *Canberra*, C.P. Fitzgerald; *Latin America*, enny Lernoux; *London*, Raymond Williams; *Paris*, Claude Bourdet; *Peking*, ames Aronson. *Columnists*: Carey McWilliams, Calvin Trillin. *Contributing 'ditor*, Blair Clark. *Editorial Board*: James Baldwin, Norman Birnbaum, ichard Falk, Frances FitzGerald, Philip Green, Robert Lekachman, idney Morgenbesser, Aryeh Neier, Marcus Raskin, A.W. Singham, Alan Volfe.

Publisher, Hamilton Fish

Advertising Manager, Susan Ellen Heitler; *Business Manager*, Ann B. Epstein; *Circulation Manager*, Gloria Sangster; *Production Coordinator*, Deborah Thomas; *Assistant to Publisher*, Karen Polk; *Staff*, John Holtz, Greta Loell; *Administrative Secretary*, Shirley Sulat; *Nation Associates*, Claudine Bacher. *Nation News Service*, Joanne Grant.

The Nation (ISSN 0027-8378) is published weekly (except for the first week in January, and bi-weekly in July and August) by Nation Enterprises and © 1979 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10014. Tel.: 212-242-8400. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. International Telex: 667 155 NATION.

Subscription Price: One year, $21; two years, $37. Student rate $15 a year. Add $3 per year postage for Canada and Mexico; $5 other foreign. All foreign subscriptions must be paid in equivalent U.S. funds.

EDITORIALS.

Big-Oil Bonanza

Carter has done more to place our economy at the oil companies' mercy than all our previous Presidents put together. Lyndon Johnson may have been a creature of the Texas oilmen, but when he left office the price of natural gas was still tightly controlled by the Federal Power Commission and the domestic oil industry was still supplying the great majority of our energy needs, at prices even poor people could afford. Under Nixon and Ford, the price of natural gas doubled, but the price lid was still controlled by the F.P.C., however loosely and grudgingly. During two years of Carter, however, home-heating oil increased almost as much as it did in eight years of Nixon and Ford.

Natural gas was deregulated last year, as the first part of Carter's energy war on the American consumer, and this maneuver has already cost us—and handed the major oil companies—an extra $2 billion. Now comes the second half of Carter's war on the people, in which he will deregulate the price of domestic crude oil, beginning on June 1. Not-so-gradually it will ascend to world market—which is to say, OPEC-dictated—prices. The American consumer at present saves about $15 billion a year as a result of the price differences between domestic and foreign oils. Carter's order means we will be paying at least 20 cents more per gallon of gasoline. Home-heating oil will climb proportionately. So will oil company profits. Oil industry analysts predicted that this quarter will see the highest profits ever—ranging up to 100 percent.

Unnoticed by all consumers and most of the press—judging from the minuscule coverage it received—was Carter's sly edict on March 1 that allows refiners to tack on to the cost of gasoline an increased percentage of crude oil and refining costs. By this one action Carter began pumping an additional $5 billion a year into the pockets of the industry. The June 1 deregulation comes on top of that.

What the oil companies have not gotten by Carter's largess, they have taken by deceitful actions and by theft. In December, Representative Bob Eckhardt's House Commerce Oversight Subcommittee investigators charged, and supported with details, that Tex-

The Sherrod Library
EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY
Johnson City, Tennessee
APR 23 1979
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aco, Union Oil, Mobil and Shell were deliberately underproducing unleaded gasoline in an effort to drive prices up. Four months ago, the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power discovered that by overcharging for crude oil, the major companies had reaped at least an extra $2 billion during the previous four years.

Carter piously vows to tie oil deregulation to a plan to tax 50 percent of the industry's profits (which, at best, is like sentencing a murderer to walk halfway to the gallows). Senator Henry Jackson, who usually speaks for the Senate in energy matters, says flatly that "the tax will not pass." Of course it will not. Carter never thought it would. The tax proposal is supposed to prove, once again, that that crafty ol' country boy from Plains can hoodwink the American public over and over and over again.

Staying Death

The headline news from General Zia's Pakistan, the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran and Prime Minister Botha's Republic of South Africa is all the same these days: executions. The United States was within a hair's breadth of joining that company when Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist stayed the execution of John Louis Evans 3d, six hours before he was scheduled to die in the electric chair at Alabama's Atmore Prison on April 6.

In some ways, it was a surprising development. Like the two most recent victims of the death penalty in the United States, Gary Gilmore in Utah in 1977 and José Monge in Colorado in 1967, Evans objected to all legal efforts to interfere with his execution. While any right Evans might have to commit suicide doesn't extend to getting the state to do the job for him, the law had to be bent in order to bring, against his wishes, a legal proceeding on behalf of an adult who had not been found incompetent. It is difficult to imagine a less sympathetic judge in such a proceeding than Justice Rehnquist, who took the case because Justice Lewis Powell, who ordinarily considers requests for stays from the Fifth Circuit, is ill. Rehnquist is the Supreme Court's most outspoken opponent of judicial intervention in the decisions of the other levels of government and the most reliable ideological ally of proponents of capital punishment. Yet despite his judicial philosophy and his ideological predilections, he kept Evans alive.

While opponents of capital punishment would have been rash to predict what Rehnquist would do in such circumstances, his action was a vindication of their strategy. They have employed every legal maneuver they could devise to delay executions, and the result is a *de facto* moratorium that in twelve years has only been broken once, by the firing-squad execution of Gilmore in 1977. The longer the moratorium lasts, the more prominent each execution becomes, making it more difficult for the public official confronted with a request for a stay or a clemency petition to pass or routinely. If capital punishment ever becomes r tine, the official's sense of personal responsibility executing a particular prisoner would be effac Like Zia, Khomeini and Botha, he could say that he merely allowing the machinery of justice to opera

William Rehnquist could not act routinely. alone stood between John Evans and the elect chair. No doubt Rehnquist is as firm a supporter capital punishment as before, but he demonstrated the evening of April 5 that he does not want to ta personal responsibility for an execution. By staying until the full Supreme Court can consider a petiti from Evans's mother, Rehnquist brought in others share his burden.

The significance of Rehnquist's action was not lo on death row prisoners, as I discovered the next da when I visited the Florida State Prison at Raifor The 1,400 men confined there include some 126 w have been sentenced to die, more than in any oth state and about a quarter of the nationwide total. capital punishment ever becomes routine again i this country, the Florida State Prison will resemble human abattoir.

In the company of Scharlette Holdman of the Flo ida Clearinghouse on Criminal Justice, a regular vi itor to the prison, I spent several hours talking to tw inmates, John Spenkelink and Leo Alford. Spenk link is likely to be at the center of the next drama ove an execution. He was convicted in 1973 of the murde of a drifter with whom he had traveled across th country (a jury did not believe his claim of sel defense), and the Supreme Court recently decline to review his case. Spenkelink's fate now rests wit the Governor and his Cabinet, who serve as Florida' clemency board. Alford, a black man convicted i 1973 of the rape-murder of a 13-year-old white girl has also attracted widespread attention because h has steadfastly maintained his innocence, because th crime seems so foreign to his character and becaus evidence discovered after his conviction might estab lish his innocence if he gets the new trial he i seeking.

Spenkelink and Alford were delighted with Rehnquist's decision because it makes it more likely that the next scheduled execution will not be a routine event. The next public official in Rehnquist's shoes must alone decide whether a man will live or die. Burdened with this responsibility, he is more likely to find some way to avoid the execution.

The condemned men eagerly asked Holdman about the progress of a bill in the Florida legislature substituting death by lethal injection for electrocution. This is touted as a humanitarian measure because an injection would be less painful than electrocution, but to Spenkelink and Alford the real purpose is to make it easier to kill them. Just as the electric chair was introduced several decades ago because of public revulsion against hanging, so injections are proposed because the electric chair now has such a negative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mbolism that it is more difficult to carry out ecutions.

Legislative struggles over methods of execution d last-minute petitions for stays on behalf of prison- s who demand the right to die may seem peripheral the issue of capital punishment. Yet it is likely that ecisely those factors will determine whether the nited States rejoins those nations that engage in sys- matic legal killing. There is virtually no possibility at the death penalty will be legislatively or judi- ally abolished any time soon. The question now is hether it will be carried out. If responsibility for ecutions becomes depersonalized and if their hor- r is cosmeticized by "humane" methods, Leo Alford, ohn Spenkelink and several hundred other death ow prisoners around the country don't have much nger to live. ARYEH NEIER

ryeh Neier, a member of The Nation's *Editorial Board, is a visiting professor of law at New York University and a fellow of the New York Institute for the Humanities.*

Hanging Bhutto

"My life is a political life," the Prime Minister of Pakistan reflected one day toward the end of 1975. "As long as politics remains in this country, I shall be in politics, either in the Government or in opposition. If there is no democracy, I might not live to tell the tale. But if I *do* live to tell the tale, I'd still be interested in politics. I have no other profession."

Democracy in Pakistan did not survive, and neither did Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the brilliant, emotional, flawed and visionary man who rebuilt his country after its disastrous defeat by India in the war that tore Pakistan apart and created Bangladesh in 1971. Bhutto was overthrown in July 1977 by an army still smarting from its 1971 disgrace, and Bhutto himself was hanged and buried in secret early this month by the man who ousted him, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, whose principal contribution to his country thus far has been to impose "Islamic justice," complete with stoning for adulterers, amputation for thieves and lashes for drinkers of alcohol.

The circumstances of Bhutto's imprisonment and execution are so shocking that they very nearly justify Ramsey Clark's comment that a painfully prolonged "murder through the judicial process" had been committed. In the beginning, Zia had vowed that, "unless the heavens fall," there would be elections in October 1977, and Bhutto's party would be allowed to participate. But in September Zia denounced Bhutto as "an evil genius," canceled the elections and ordered the former Prime Minister rearrested, this time on a very serious charge of having plotted the 1974 murder of an opposition politician, Ahmed Raza Kasuri. As it happened, the paramilitary police had fired at Kasuri, missed him but killed his aged father.

The degree of Bhutto's involvement in the case will probably never be known. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan split 4 to 3 to sustain his conviction, but hinted that Zia might be well advised to show him clemency. By this time, Bhutto, after months of detention in a filthy cell in the Rawalpindi prison, was said to be emaciated almost beyond recognition. On the eve of his execution, three of his houses in various parts of the country were ransacked for "secret documents," presumably to be used as evidence against Bhutto's politically active wife and daughter, both of whom are under house arrest. He refused to ask for clemency, but after his death the Government altered the few published facts concerning the execution to imply that, at the very end, he begged for mercy.

What is perhaps most unseemly about the Bhutto case, apart from the dubious legal aspects, is the waste of that shortest of Pakistani commodities, capable civilian leadership. After coming to power in the period of dissolution, Bhutto freed the Bengali leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, allowing him to go home to what had become Bangladesh. He negotiated the return of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war whom India was holding and 5,000 square miles of border territory that India was occupying. He brought in a new constitution, he nationalized several industries, reducing the power of the legendary "twenty-two families," and he proclaimed a measure of land reform. For all his frailties, he belonged to that small company of men who are preoccupied with the task of leading their countries into the modern world.

As for those frailties, they centered on the problem of retaining power against both the military establishment and a disparate group of civilian opponents whose only common goal was to bring him down. As always, the opposition engaged in the confrontation politics it had practiced since the days of the raj, with rallies, sit-ins, walkouts, strikes and occasionally sieges, and Bhutto struck back hard. Of his own stormy years in opposition, he would say, "But *my* confrontation was with military dictators."

His obsession with the opposition led directly to his fall. His party's victory in the March 1977 elections was so stunning that practically nobody believed it; the opposition rose up in indignation and the military takeover came less than four months later. Yet Bhutto was right when he assured foreigners that his country was more fragile than it might seem, and more difficult to rule. In countries like Pakistan, he would say, "it is really a blessing, in a way, to be in the opposition, because you are not cursed from minute to minute with the harrowing and almost impossible problems that are beyond the grasp of any government." WILLIAM E. SMITH

William E. Smith was Time *magazine's correspondent in New Delhi in 1975 and 1976.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECOND THOUGHTS

CAREY McWILLIAM

The case against legalized gambling is a no-win proposition, not because it is weak (it is supported by mountains of forgotten evidence accumulated by state and Federal investigations over a period of many years) but because of an inherently fallacious if plausible logic: people are going to gamble anyway; illegal gambling breeds crime and corruption; ergo, legalize gambling, let government take its cut, and thereby reduce crime.

But in real life it does not work quite this way. Gambling is not inherent in human nature; it is a learned or acquired habit. Legalized gambling does not eliminate the illegal variety. Government revenues are never as great as projected and licensed operations breed corruption. *The Nation* has made the case against legalized gambling repeatedly over a period of years in pieces by Fred J. Cook, Milton Wessel (who headed the Attorney General's Special Group on Organized Crime) and David Hume, formerly with the Department of Justice. But to no avail.

Today New York has 155 Offtrack Betting Corporation parlors, a state lottery—and Gov. Hugh Carey proposes to license four gambling casinos. Illegal casinos are flourishing but police contend that they are powerless to close them. That is exactly what they said about illegal bookmakers. An estimated $600 million to $1.5 billion is annually wagered on the numbers, a racket supported by a million poor Hispanics and blacks. OTB has opened few parlors in minority areas; it does not want to compete with the numbers racket. Nor has OTB put illegal bookies out of business; illegal operators offer better odds and assure gamblers that the Internal Revenue Service will never know should they happen to win a bundle.

State and Federal commission studies clearly support the conclusion that one form of legalized gambling invariably breeds a politically irresistible demand for other forms. Connecticut entered the gambling business in 1971. Now it has a licensed greyhound track, three jai alai frontons, fourteen offtrack betting parlors and weekly and daily lotteries. In 1976 its 3 million residents wagered $530,399,000 (*The New York Times*, Dec. 1, 1977). Now that Atlantic City has a casino, there is growing agitation in New Jersey to license jai alai frontons. Government-sponsored gambling makes it easier for more people to gamble. Heavy promotions (coupled with small-type warnings about compulsive gambling) are conducted on radio and TV, in buses and subways, in supermarkets and drugstores in an effort to recruit thousands of new addicts.

Legalized gambling is seen as an easy out by politicians and taxpayers, a painless way of raising revenues without increasing taxes. But in 1976 a Federal commission concluded a three-year study by pointin out that the two goals of legalized gambling—revenu raising and crime control—are incompatible. By l galizing gambling the various levels of governmer are cutting into revenues they hope to raise by legit mate means. Monthly games become weekly, weekl games become daily; more and bigger prizes are o fered. But the larger the prize, the more likelihood c attracting new addicts from the minorities and th poor, making gambling "a peculiarly regressive forr of revenue raising," as Alan Otten wrote in *The Wa Street Journal*. Gamblers never win if they gambl long enough; the odds against them are too great. Ye legalized gambling is today one of our fastest grow ing industries.

The cultivated craze for gambling reflects the cor rupt values of a corrupt society. Part of the case for le galization is made by police who do not want to crack down on illegal gambling because it is a major source of payoffs. Law-enforcement officials are fond of cit ing the findings of the Knapp Commission (re member it?) which investigated police corruption ir New York in the early 1970s. The commission found that corruption often stemmed from gambling and recommended its legalization. If gambling could not be suppressed, it was said, then legalize it and let the city and state get a piece of the action. Well, the recommendation was accepted. Offtrack betting was legalized but police corruption, along with illegal bookmaking and illegal casino operations, persisted. Legalized gambling makes for hanky-panky: government gambling agencies are overrun with political patronage; payrolls are padded outrageously; no-show jobs proliferate; excessive overtime claims are routinely approved and many employees work on political campaigns. Millions are awarded each year to lease and equip OTB parlors and now it is proposed to create more of a "clubhouse atmosphere" with restaurants and live television (why no saunas?). Real estate operators make fortunes from knowledge of future casino locations. Hotels are ecstatic about casinos. They are supposed to attract visitors and fill hotel rooms. Yet the local area remains "the primary market" which translates as: local citizens are the primary suckers. Casino stocks are booming. At the current market price, Caesars of New Jersey's stock is valued at $715 million although it has yet to open a casino, whereas the stock of the parent Nevada corporation is valued at only $466 million.

I do not remember that I have ever previously quoted Thomas E. Dewey with approval. But in 1950 he denounced the original proposal to legalize offtrack betting as "shocking, immoral, and indecent." It would, he said, be indecent for government to finance itself so heavily out of the weaknesses of its people, which it had deliberately encouraged. But how quaint that sounds today! □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ARTICLES.

■ SHORTFALLS & WINDFALLS

The Phony Oil Crisis

PETER DEUTSCH

Faced with the onslaught of crisis propaganda manufactured by the Department of Energy in order to make way for oil price decontrol and relaxation of environmental protection laws, an aide to Representative Albert Gore of Tennessee made the dismal prediction that the oil companies are "going to win. They're going to make out like bandits."

Since Iran reduced oil exports last November, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger has repeatedly stated that there is a severe worldwide shortfall of oil. Just as frequently, he has predicted that this shortfall will worsen and that it will have dire consequences for the free world. At the same time, Schlesinger has persistently called for the decontrol of gasoline and domestic crude oil prices in the belief that higher prices will result from decontrol, and that these prices will increase domestic oil production and reduce domestic oil consumption. These actions, it is hypothesized, will reduce United States vulnerability to foreign oil-pricing decisions. As a corollary to his argument, Schlesinger has insisted that higher oil prices are necessary to make nuclear energy and coal-to-oil conversion (both of which are integral parts of the Department of Energy's long-term energy program) more cost-effective in comparison to oil.

In order to create this atmosphere of emergency, Schlesinger has used the expedient of demanding that much environmental legislation be altered or rescinded, arguing that environmental benefits are too often outweighed by energy costs. Since one panic measure reinforces another, we now find Schlesinger asking that nearly all of Alaska be opened to oil exploration: how can the United States leave Alaska's wilderness undisturbed in the face of an energy crisis?

The fact is that decontrol of domestic crude and gasoline prices could have severe consequences for the entire United States economy, creating both high unemployment and high inflation. Consumers would pay more, and the poor, the old and those on fixed incomes would, as usual, be especially devastated. Relaxation of environmental standards will no doubt set a dangerous precedent for future environmental legislation, and if Alaska is despoiled, the damage there will be irreversible.

Many Representatives and Senators are aware of these dangers; thus far they have been able to prevent the implementation of the Energy Department's policies. But if these members of Congress are persuaded that a shortfall of oil due to the Iranian crisis constitutes a new crisis, the political constraints on executing the D.O.E.'s desired policies may be lifted. As an Energy Department official put it, "It is necessary to scare Congress and the American people to conserve energy." Edwin Rothschild of Energy Action, a consumer interest group, put it another way: "What the Energy Department and the oil companies are doing is blackmail."

It is interesting that Western European and Japanese Governments have not spoken of the Iranian shortfall in the same gloomy light as has the United States Energy Department, even though some of these countries are far more dependent than we on Iranian oil. As West Germany's Economics Minister Otto Lambsdorf has said, "What we have is a problem of price, not supply."

There follows the scenario of five Energy Department policies by which a crisis is created.

(1) *Supply:*

Worldwide, the rate of oil production for the first quarter of 1979 was the same as that for the first three quarters of 1978. The Department of Energy acknowledges this fact; however, it claims that the first nine months of 1978 were an abnormally low period for worldwide production because of high inventory buildups at the end of 1977 and large inventory drawdowns during the first three quarters of 1978. Nevertheless, by the D.O.E.'s own estimates there were higher worldwide inventories of oil in the first quarter of 1979 than in the first quarter of 1978. In fact, according to a C.I.A. interagency memorandum, levels of world oil production are higher this year than they were at this time last year and since world inventories are also higher now than last year, any worldwide shortfall must be due to either increased demand or abnormal inventory buildups.

The Energy Department stated that while Iran was not exporting any oil there was a 2-million-barrel-a-day worldwide shortfall. However, various oil exporting nations with excess oil production capacity increased production by approximately 5 million barrels a day. Five million barrels a day was almost the exact level of Iranian exports prior to the upheaval in that country.

The United States, the Energy Department calculated, experienced a shortfall of 500,000 barrels a day between December 1978 and March 1979; the department points to American Petroleum Institute figures which seem to indicate that imports to the United States decreased during that period. However, International Energy Agency data for the United States show an *increase* of imports—from 8.4 million barrels a day in December 1978 to 9.97 million in February 1979. The D.O.E.'s *Petroleum Demand Watch* dis-

Peter Deutsch, a senior at Swarthmore College, has received a J. Roland Pennock Fellowship to investigate the future politics of oil. He will enter Yale Law School in the fall.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

closes that imports have been uniformly higher since November 1978 than in comparable time periods the previous year; *Oil and Gas Journal*'s calculations show a similar increase in domestic production.

According to the latest figures published by the American Petroleum Institute, oil companies here have been building inventories; crude oil stocks increased between January and February 1979 by 8,103,000 barrels. A.P.I. data indicate that gasoline and aviation fuel inventories have actually increased since the Iranian crisis by more than could be accounted for in normal seasonal adjustments.

(2) *Demand*:

The worldwide demand for oil, the Department of Energy projected early last year, would increase by 5 percent between 1977 and 1978; in September 1978, the department adjusted those predictions downward to a 3.8 percent increase. In December 1978, they adjusted those predictions downward again—to a 3 percent increase. Deputy Energy Secretary John O'Leary acknowledges that "all of our demand data are 'apparent consumption' data. We have no actual consumption data."

However, consumption data (as opposed to projected demand increase) from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for O.E.C.D. countries, which use 80 percent of the free world's oil show only a 1.1 percent increase during the first three quarters of 1978. If one were to project that non-O.E.C.D. free-world countries increased consumption at their historical rate of 7 percent, the total worldwide increase for the first three quarters of 1978 would be 2 percent. The difference between the Energy Department's original projection of a 5 percent increase and a 2 percent increase is approximately 1,388,000 barrels per day.

Contrary to the D.O.E. predictions, demand for petroleum will probably decrease as a result of the unexpectedly high price increases since December. However, the D.O.E. has *not* altered its projected percentage demand increase to account for a price increase. This is curious, considering the department's policy of promoting high prices to foster conservation; the department's demand projections are also based on an optimistic pattern of growth in the world economy. Unfortunately, this is not at all what the experts are expecting—they predict an economic slowdown, which would decrease oil consumption.

For the United States, the Department of Energy calculated the amount of shortfall assuming a 2 percent increase in demand. However, the department's weekly publication, *Petroleum Demand Watch*, points out that demand did not rise this rapidly even before the Iranian turmoil. Since then, demand has fallen off sharply. O'Leary of the D.O.E. says consumption has gone down 700,000 barrels to 830,000 barrels a day, a *decrease* of 4 percent from one year ago. If there is a shortage in the United States, it is unlikely that it can be attributed primarily to an increase in demand.

(3) *Stockpiling Strategic Petroleum Reserve*:

During the month of January, when the Energy Department estimated that the United States was experiencing an oil shortfall of 500,000 barrels per day the Strategic Petroleum Reserve of the United States was being filled at a rate of 229,000 barrels per day. The interesting aspect of America's Strategic Petroleum Reserve is that there is at present no way to retrieve the oil being put into the Reserve's salt domes. Although the Energy Department has the option of directing oil destined to the S.P.R. into United States markets, it has not exercised this option. An Energy Department official tried to explain the S.P.R. debacle as nothing more than bureaucratic inertia.

(4) *Directing Oil Companies to Stockpile*:

Rather than directing oil companies to draw down inventories to meet any shortfall, the Energy Department publicly requested, in the *Federal Register* on February 28, that oil companies increase their stocks (inventories). The companies were all busily attempting to build up inventories anyway. As one petroleum analyst put it, "It is not in the economic interest of the oil companies to draw down stocks when the market is going up. Every barrel that is saved can be sold for a windfall profit in the future." Dario Scuka, a petroleum economist for the Congressional Research Service, pointed out that "those who stand to gain from price speculation . . . will usually hoard oil."

The actual increases in inventories may be much higher than the American Petroleum Institute figures mentioned earlier indicate, because of secondary and tertiary stockpilings, which include tactics such as radioing oil tankers to slow down en route to the United States, stockpiling oil in producing countries or stopping domestic production at a given well.

If oil companies are in fact stockpiling, it would explain why there have been cutbacks in refined products even though demand has not increased while domestic crude oil production and imports have increased. Some of this discrepancy could also be attributed to companies cutting back products to fixed-price customers in order to sell products at higher prices on the spot market.

(5) *Lack of Interest in Increasing Total Worldwide Supply*:

Petroleum geologists deny that there is a shortage of oil due to natural conditions. They suggest instead that any shortage is the result of economic and political constraints on production. Craig Karpel, the executive director of Energy Policy Inc., has noted that "Bernard Grossling, a geophysicist with the United States Geological Survey, has performed a study for the World Bank that estimates total petroleum reserves as high as 6,000 billion barrels—ten times the figure for proven reserves lugubriously cited by James Schlesinger and his retinue."

The Energy Department has given lip service to various plans to increase world oil production. From proposals to buy Mexican natural gas to proposals to grant tax credits to United States companies for investment in oil exploration and production in non-OPEC countries, the D.O.E. has consistently favored those policies which would not foster increased world-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ide production. At the same time that the department is drawing up programs to decrease consumption here by 1 million barrels a day, it has done othing to increase worldwide supply.

The Energy and Fuels Division of the State Department publicly declares that the United States has requested oil-producing countries with excess capacity o increase production even more while Iranian production is still at a reduced level. But privately, State Department officials acknowledge that no quid pro quo has been offered for increased production nor has subtle pressure been used.

Although Secretary Schlesinger has remarked that "The Saudis find it hard to sustain continuously a level of more than 10 million barrels a day," the Saudis have at least a million-barrel capacity in excess of their present production ceiling of 9.5 million barrels a day. Sheik Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Wealth of Saudi Arabia, said that, "We can extract as much as 11 million barrels a day. . . ." James Knight, a spokesman for the Arabian American Oil Company which produces the Saudi oil said, "There are no technical problems in producing 11.5 million barrels a day." A Petroleum Industry Research Foundation study found current Saudi capacity to be around 12 million barrels a day.

In the oil industry the Department of Energy has found a strong ally with mutual interests. For example, Exxon Corporation proposes that "energy pricing policies should be made conducive to expanding energy development [i.e., decontrol of crude production prices and decontrol of gasoline prices]. Efforts should be made to establish more balanced environmental regulations and procedures. Oil and gas exploration should be encouraged in all parts of the United States, particularly in offshore and Alaskan areas which are considered the most promising." Whether Exxon's proposals are for profit maximization or the public good, the proposals are congruent with the D.O.E.'s policies. No matter how decontrol of oil takes place, oil that is stockpiled when decontrol occurs will yield a windfall profit. No matter how the "lead phasedown program" is slowed down, gasoline that is stockpiled will yield windfall profits.

The coalition of the oil companies and the Energy Department is quite strong, as Representative Gore learned. Gore released a Congressional Research Service study on March 1 alleging that the shortage of oil due to the Iranian crisis is only 240,000 barrels per day, not the 2 million barrels daily that the Department of Energy is reporting. White House officials, Department of Energy spokesmen and oil industry flacks condemned the study as "reckless," "a disservice to our country," "the worst form of manipulation" and "a fake."

Several major publications responding to private requests of Secretary Schlesinger either played down the Gore study or criticized it. For instance, *The Washington Post*, which is committed to an editorial policy for decontrol and higher oil prices (and which



DRAWINGS BY LOU MYERS

Jim Flug, director of Energy Action, pointed out has "Bob Anderson, the chairman of ARCO, as its energy guru") devoted its lead editorial of March 5 to the controversy raised by the Gore study. The editorial concluded, "Evidently, they [the twenty industrialized nations of the International Energy Agency] do not take Mr. Gore's charge seriously. Evidently they concluded the shortage is real and that it is dangerous. They are right."

If the oil shortage is "real" it is because oil companies are building up inventories. The companies do not intend to reduce the inventories at the present price levels; it makes perfect economic sense for them to act in exactly the way they have been acting.

Oil companies have often used political crises for their economic benefit. As the Gore study points out, "After the emergency has subsided, the forces that have pushed prices upward never allow prices to recede to their previous levels. Thus, the world price structure has assumed after each 'emergency' a higher permanent plateau."

In 1951, when Iran nationalized its oilfields and exported almost no oil, prices soared immediately and oil companies acquired windfall profits. Research subsequent to 1951 indicates that there was no decrease in world supply due to the interruption of Iranian exports. In 1956, when the Suez Canal was closed, oil prices rose almost immediately and oil companies again acquired windfall profits. Again, research shows no decrease in world supply because the Suez Canal was closed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1973 when the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) placed an embargo on oil to several countries and threatened to decrease OAPEC's oil production, prices increased almost immediately, resulting in profits for the oil companies. The embargo played a decisive part in the debate on opening up Alaska to oil production and on allowing an oil pipeline to cut across Alaska. The price rises accompanying the embargo helped create the worst recession the United States has had since World War II. Subsequent research revealed that there was only an insignificant decrease in world oil production because of the embargo and cutbacks.

Since December 1978, when Iran stopped exporting oil, oil prices increased and oil companies are reaping huge profits. The price rises have already worsened the inflation rate. President Carter has now proposed a policy of gradual decontrol of the price for domestic crude oil which will probably drive refined petroleum product prices and the rate of inflation even higher. Environmental regulations have already been temporarily suspended in several states, and an Alaskan land bill favoring oil interests has just been approved by a House subcommittee. Once again it appears that there is no significant shortage and that the oil companies and the Energy Department are working together to take full advantage of a political situation. □

REPORT FROM THE OILFIELDS

The Workers' Committees Are Pumping Iran

KAI BIRD

Abadan, Iran

In the waning days of the Pahlevi regime, as the army began to disintegrate, hundreds of komitehs—spontaneous revolutionary committees—filled the power vacuum in the name of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Although these komitehs are still visible in every factory, office building, neighborhood and town, none plays a more significant role than those in the oilfields. The worker komitehs in Iran's strategic oilfields, allied with the Ayatollah but in fact more radical than his conservative Provisional Revolutionary Government, have disrupted the delicate workings of the international oil economy.

Until Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi began to teeter on his opulent Peacock Throne last year, Iran was considered a pillar of the West's energy system. Although the Iranian oilfields were nationalized as early as 1951, little control had actually passed from the hands of a Western consortia of multinational oil companies. The consortia of fourteen companies—the majority shares belonging to British Petroleum (40 percent) and a group of eleven American companies (40 percent)—still marketed most of Iran's oil, giving their own companies the right to buy oil at a discount. Production levels were determined by just two criteria: how much oil the multinationals wanted on the world market and how many billions of dollars the Shah needed to ply his military machine. By 1978 this alliance between the Shah and the multinationals squeezed some 5.5 million barrels per day out of the country's reserves. Iran was the source of some 10 percent of the United States' oil imports.

Today, the Iranian revolution has changed all that and while the Western press has concerned itself with minor technical questions about the Iranians' capacity to produce significant oil for export without the benefit of expatriate engineers (the answer is an unequivocal yes), it has ignored the fact that the West will be dealing with an entirely new system. Across the negotiating table, Western importers will still face a pinstripe executive from the National Iranian Oil Company, but behind that executive will stand the worker komiteh, exercising its collective will over the country's oil policies.

The oil industry is virtually controlled by dozens of independent worker komitehs which, though loyal to the present Government, are nevertheless participating in all the decisions related to the production and marketing of Iranian oil to the Western industrial world. Perhaps even more significant, the worker komitehs have now been running the oilfields and refineries for more than six months—without their top-rank Iranian managers and without the expertise of some 800 foreign technicians. (The main Abadan refinery is still in operation producing refined oil for domestic use and the oilfields are producing more than 3 million barrels per day.)

The presence of these komitehs in nearly every phase of Iranian oil operations is responsible for a new national oil policy based on conservation, diversification of exports, a ban on exports to South Africa and Israel, the cancellation of expensive capital investments like the gas injection projects and a determination to eliminate the multinational middlemen in the marketing of their oil. Every aspect of the new policy has already had a direct impact on American, British and other Western economies.

As it happens, the worker komitehs in the oilfields are substantially to the left of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, which is rather more conservative than many in the West have been led to believe. In a little-noticed speech on March 31, 1979, Minister of Economy Ali Radalan remarked that the new Government was well aware that the United States dollar needed support, and that Iran was willing to recycle its petrodollars to the West. In support of this policy, Ali Radalan cited his Government's decision to main-

Kai Bird, assistant editor of The Nation, *has just returned from a two-week trip to Iran.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ıin Iranian investments in West Germany's Krupp ıdustries and complete the construction of at least vo West German-manufactured nuclear plants in ;usher.

Those Iranians with social democratic leanings /ho view the Provisional Revolutionary Government s a disappointment look to the oil workers as an im-ortant counterweight in the present conservative ide. This is not to say that these workers opposed the reation of an Islamic Republic in last month's refer-ndum. Most are practicing Moslems—but of the ;ind that believe that a religious movement which ɔegan with the uncompromising demand for the re-noval of the Shah will not end until the religion itself ındergoes a radical reorientation.

"It is true," says Ahmed Moghadamizadeh, the ɛlected speaker of the Abadan oil refinery central ko-miteh, "that many of us feel the revolution is moving too slowly. There are problems with some of the mul-lahs. . . . They are what we call Saffadi Shi'ia. We are followers of the reformist theology preached by the late Dr. Ali Shariati."

The radicalism of the oil workers is thus a reflec-tion of ideological tensions *within* the religious camp. Secular critics no doubt exist, but any realistic hope of democratic and economic reforms, for the moment, lies in the religious realm. The masses of the Iranian people simply cannot be moved to any significant po-litical action without using the language of religion.

Shi'ite Islam—as opposed to the Sunni brand of Islam practiced by most of Iran's Arab neigh-bors—contains two competing traditions, one radical and one fundamentalist and conserva-tive. First, the Shi'ite sect's primary mandate has al-ways been to struggle against illegitimate political authority on behalf of society's poor and powerless. But, second, the Shi'ites' independent hierarchy of clergy have been all too willing to seize temporal power for themselves. The term Saffadi Shi'ism (or state Shi'ism) is a reference to the Saffadi Dynasty's 16th-century subjugation of the clergy to secular power. Reformist theologians, like the late Dr. Ali Shariati, charge that many corruptions of the reli-gion, including the wearing of the chador for women, were introduced during the Saffadi dynasty.

Ayatollah Khomeini himself is reportedly torn be-tween the two traditions, desiring on the one hand to construct an Islamic state premised on a rather un-democratic or mystical political consensus and on the other hand, still convinced that only an Islamic Re-public can uplift Iran's impoverished millions. The contradictions between this Saffadi Shi'ism and the reformist, social egalitarian elements are sometimes quite bewildering. To begin with, it compels those revolutionaries who now command power in Teheran to deny the existence of class conflict. "In an Islamic Republic," says Hassan Bani Sadr, a Paris-trained economist and Khomeini aide still much admired by the oil workers, "there is no left and there is no right!"

The oil workers are largely unaware, however, of the tensions that have already developed in Teheran among a number of competing factions in the Provi-sional Government. And they are also unaware that the Government has already chosen to suppress—occasionally by force—labor unrest, peasant land grabs and ethnic minority demands for regional au-tonomy. The Government has repeatedly condemned attempts by worker komitehs in the automobile facto-ries to shut out their managers. And, in several in-stances, the army has been used to expel peasants who had occupied their landlords' farms, chanting, "The land belongs to Allah, and Allah is the people!"

These indications of a rightward drift in the Provi-sional Revolutionary Government have gone largely unnoticed by the oil workers, isolated as they are in the southern oilfields along the Persian Gulf. The local worker komitehs profess unqualified support for Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and his oil chief, lawyer Hassan Nazih. But, like many educated Iranians—practicing Moslems or otherwise—the oil workers universally express their marked preference for the liberal Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, a radi-cal religious leader based in Teheran who was impris-oned for many years with a group of Iranian Marxists. Taleghani is a strong advocate of the reform-ist theology popularized by Dr. Ali Shariati. "We give Khomeini due respect for so stubbornly refusing to compromise with the Shah," says a boilermaker in the Abadan refinery. "But after all, Dr. Shariati wrote this revolution. Khomeini only led it. And now that we have an Islamic Republic, Khomeini must rely on people like Taleghani if the revolution is to continue."

Expectations of substantial economic reform are extremely high among the oil workers of Abadan and Ahwaz. Dozens of worker and professional komitehs still exist nearly two months after the revolution. (Shortly before oil chief Hassan Nazih left for Geneva to attend the March 21 meeting of OPEC, he drafted a memorandum instructing a number of komitehs to disband. According to sources within the National Iranian Oil Company, Nazih was instructed to with-draw the memo by the Central Revolutionary Coun-cil.) The central komiteh of the Abadan refinery has been managing the unit's entire operations for nearly six months. The komitehs in Ahwaz have shut out the top six managers in the oil exploration and produc-tion departments. An engineer working in the sensi-tive production department in the Ahwaz fields told me, "We support Nazih so far because he has listened to our suggestions. He has not insisted on reinstate-ment of these discredited managers. He has agreed to scrap the expensive and wasteful gas injection proj-ects, which were only needed when the Shah re-quired us to produce at maximum capacity. And he has agreed not to produce more than 3.7 million to 4 million barrels per day. We believe anything above that level damages the reservoirs—and in any case, this country cannot efficiently spend oil revenues from more than 3 million barrels per day of exports. But if this Government ever began to squander our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national treasure, I tell you, we'd strike the fields again."

It is unlikely, however, that the oil workers will ever become the cutting edge of a political movement. It should be remembered that they did not really come out against the Shah until October 3, 1978, nearly a month after the September 8 "Black Friday" massacre in Teheran. And even then, twelve of the twenty-nine-member central strike komiteh in Abadan voted against raising political demands. But the five-month-long strike has left its mark. The komitehs in the oilfields will remain, some as political "watchdog" organizations, but largely as highly politicized trade union vehicles.

Despite vast differences in pay and housing, both the worker and professional komitehs have agreed that substantial labor reforms are in order. The professionals—many of whom earn more than $25,000 a year—claim they are willing to take substantial pay cuts. Ahmed Moghadamizadeh, the speaker of the Abadan refinery komiteh, says that he believes the differences in wages should be narrowed to something like a minimum of $428 per month for a worker and a maximum of $2,142 for top management. (I talked to a 28-year-old welder in the Abadan refinery who, after six years on the job, earns about $180 per month. A 52-year-old boilermaker, by contrast, brings in $385 per month to support two wives and ten children. Some managers under the Pahlevi regime were earning more than $7,000 per month.)

The Government's reaction to these wage demands may become a political barometer of things to come. Slashing exorbitant wages is a popular and relatively painless solution. Allocating a larger portion of shrunken oil revenues among a strategic labor force already viewed as a worker aristocracy in the Iranian context may be politically difficult.

Even more sensitive are the public demands made by some of the worker komitehs for the right to supervise their own jobs. "We are not going to be slaves to these machines," says a young welder. "Labor in the West is forced to obey management and produce only for consumption, always more and more consumption. It is your God. But in an Islamic Republic, the community and not consumption is the main goal." The thirty-member central worker komiteh in the Abadan refinery has already voted to change the work rules, and a wage increase proposal is being drafted for presentation to the Government. The komiteh meets every other day inside the refinery—and it is not hard to believe that six months from now Iran's oil workers may be back on strike, this time for the economic reforms promised by what has to date only been a political revolution.

Having only so recently discovered their political muscle, oil workers, one can be certain, will not easily relinquish their attachment to trade unionism. The komitehs will survive in one form or another, which suggests that whatever the course of the Iranian revolution, the oil workers will contribute to a certain democratic equilibrium. But their brand of trade unionism, emerging as it did out of a peculiar non-Western tradition, also suggests that the Irani oil workers will establish an important precedent f other third-world nations in the production and ma keting of their natural resources. The worker komi ehs want to participate in these decisions—and if the persevere, there will be little room left for the fellow from Exxon.

COUNTDOWN TO MELTDOWN

Grace Under Pressure in Harrisburg

IRA D. ROSEN

Harrisburg, Pa

Once again reporters proved that when there is a disaster, or the potential of a big one they come in huge numbers. But residents here faced the radioactive fallout and threa of complete annihilation with a suicidal grace, calmly resigning themselves to the situation regardless o the consequences.

Robert Fine, a rig operator from Harrisburg, was in a small diner 30 miles outside the city on Friday March 30, contemplating the radioactivity down the road. "I bombed babies and children in World War II so I guess I'm getting what I deserve," he said. "I have lived a full life. It has to end sometime."

At the Harrisburg train station one woman started to flee the town, then changed her mind and walked back home. "I'll melt before I'll leave," she said.

This gallows humor displaced much of the fear and brought the people together to share the common experience. A radio disk jockey introduced records with "and here's some fallout for those of you craving isotopes," as he played songs with appropriate titles—"Hot Child in the City," "Hot Line," "Disco Inferno." Bars in nearby Middletown, fearing the worst, closed on Friday. One bar was open, but deserted, with a bottle of scotch on a table next to a newspaper headlined "Fallout."

The people here were determined not to be driven out by an unseen enemy. It is hard to decide whether this was a good attitude when nuclear disaster was an imminent possibility. Reports of radioactive leakage raged throughout the week. Most of the residents didn't believe what they couldn't see. They were not burying their heads in the sand, but at the same time

Ira D. Rosen has written for numerous magazines and newspapers including The New York Times, The Washington Post, New Times *and* Sport.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ey also were not being flexible to life's changing uations.

With all the portents of doom for Pennsylvania, journlists were stymied on how to cover the story. Since the cident on March 28, the media has relied on a handful public relations men for their information on what as occurring at the Three Mile Island nuclear wer plant. "This is the worst case of pack journalm I have ever seen," said Curtis Wilkie, White ouse correspondent of *The Boston Globe*. "The press greedily gobbling up whatever the public relations eople tell it. It is just one big game."

One journalist who watched the whole event with mused detachment was Michael Gray, who wrote ie script for the movie *The China Syndrome*, about a ctional nuclear reactor mishap. Gray, a bearded and brasive Californian with a small gold ring in one ear nd a large white hat on his head, went unrecognized. Ie had listened to the daily developments and felt he iad to come here to see for himself.

Gray's movie idea came from articles he wrote durng the late 1950s on Lockheed's "Electra" plane. Gray says that the Electra was the plane of the day, he safest and fastest one on the market. The plane iad been tested hundreds of times for possible defects ind it had been perfect. It was perfect, Gray says, exept for the "cracks between the system." Mathematically, the odds of an accident happening are one in a million. But one day, the speed of the plane combined with the wind velocity combined with the plane's altitude, caused the plane to crash. Checks done afterward could not immediately determine what happened. Gray, however, understood. No machine is perfect. Eventually it will fail.

Aware of the possible dangers of nuclear plants, Gray began extensive research five years ago into a reactor's workings. Asked about the eerie coincidence of the accident at Three Mile Island and the movie's release, he jokingly denies jimmying the machine. He came, he says, to learn what did go wrong and to observe the response of residents and the plant's workers. Gray's next project will be on the failure of a space shuttle flight.

Together Gray and I searched among the townspeople and workers for individual acts of bravery. Our first stop was at the home of Thomas Kaufman, a control-room operator in reactor room number two, the site of the near-disaster. Kaufman, 26, is a good-looking, muscular man who wears his red hair long. For the last year and a half he worked inside the plant and was often exposed to very small amounts of radiation. But when the accident occurred he was exposed to a massive dose. It was then that he decided to quit. "My girlfriend just didn't want to sleep with a radioactive man anymore," he said.

But Kaufman kept on the job during the crisis. He realized that the danger was very great, but he felt a duty to help, even at the risk of his own health. So the day after the accident he returned to the plant and again entered a highly radioactive area. Kaufman was not trying to prove his *macho* qualities (many workers openly brag about the radiation levels they have sustained and say that a six-pack of beer could wash it away), he was doing it out of responsibility to humanity.

Outside the plant several workers who did not want to be identified told stories of the man with the presence of mind that saved the day. Ed Frederick, 29, was control-room operator at 4:30 A.M. Wednesday when the flashing light on the console signaled trouble. The polishing machine, the unit that purifies the water before it enters the generator, was left open by an employee, causing the air pressure to disappear. Another valve in the auxiliary cooling system was closed, preventing water from entering the nuclear core. Like a scene right from *The China Syndrome* the dials showed the water level was high while no water was entering the core. The heat was



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increasing steadily. Frederick quickly considered what the problem could be and acted on his instincts, opening the valves so that the water from the secondary cooling system could quickly enter the generator. His "grace under pressure," which is how Hemingway defined courage, prevented a sure nuclear catastrophe.

Bravery among the residents was less pronounced but, in its own small way, equally dramatic. Grocery owners chose to remain open and provide staples to people needing supplies before leaving town. With the danger on the island still very real, residents did not go on massive pillages, as has happened in cities around the country when their lights went off for a few hours or policemen went on strike. The dreamlike quality of the fear, the unseen assassin in the night ready to strike this fragile city down with a cloud of clear vapor, brought the people together for comfort and safety. Even reporters were affected and, uncharacteristically, shared notes and sources freely.

I felt relieved when I saw the Japanese newsmen on Sunday. If any country knows about the dangers and effects of radioactivity, it is Japan. When the crisis passed people seemed disappointed. Residents had prepared for chaos and death, and, when nothing happened, many felt cheated. Others, like Gray and his companion, Mike O'Sullivan, who had covered three wars and had never felt so frightened in his life as he did in a quiet Holiday Inn room his first night in Harrisburg, were glad it was over. Life imitates art to a point, then the scene shifts to a different movie. Gray didn't want the next imitation to be of *Dr. Strangelove*. □

NATO SURCHARGE

The 3 Percent Misunderstanding

REPRESENTATIVE LES ASPIN

Washington

The Administration's proposed 3 percent real increase in defense spending for 1980 is portrayed as the fulfillment of a solemn pledge to our NATO allies, and vital to the defense of Western Europe. Upon closer analysis, however, Carter's "3 percent solution" prescription seems closer to a patent-medicine cure-all.

In the first place, most of America's NATO allies have not kept their end of the bargain. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway and Britain plan to add 3 percent in real growth to their defense budgets this year. But Canada, Denmark, Gree Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Turkey do r Because of their weak economies, Turkey and Por gal were not expected to come through, but the oth cannot similarly plead poverty.

The United States' financial contributions NATO continue to be disproportionately large. spend about 55 percent more on defense than all other NATO nations combined, and devote a high percentage of our gross national product to defe than any other NATO country. Our per capita penditure is twice that of all the other countri Thirty years after NATO's founding, the Unit States continues to contribute more than its share the defense of Europe, while the Europeans do r pull their own weight. Indeed, most of our NATO lies will go right on spending what they want to spe on defense, no matter what contribution the Unit States makes.

This aside, what is the reason for the 3 percent fi ure anyway? Ostensibly, the NATO ministers to the 3 percent growth pledge at the Ministerial Sessi in May 1977 because they believed that Soviet m itary spending had been growing at more or less th rate. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, for exar ple, declared before the House Armed Services Cor mittee last October that

> In view of the steady and long-standing military buildup in the past of the Soviet Union, resulting from their increase in defense spending of 4 to 5 percent in real terms each year for nearly twenty years, we must bolster our own defenses and encourage our NATO allies to do the same for the NATO alliance. Why 3 percent? I suppose you could say why is it not much more?

The NATO ministerial conference was even mor emphatic on the matter in 1977, asserting that the S viet Union has been annually increasing its defens spending, in real terms, by "about 5 percent."

Let's look at these percentages more closely, usin the Central Intelligence Agency's annual estimates c Soviet military spending over the past decade. Th C.I.A. produces dual estimates, one in dollars, th other in rubles. The dollar estimate is arrived at b calculating the cost in dollars of reproducing the So viet military establishment at going American prices salaries and costs. The ruble estimate is toughe since a ruble is worth essentially whatever a Sovie economic planner says it is at any given time. How ever imperfect, the C.I.A.'s estimates do provide a serviceable approximation of trends in Soviet spend ing over the years.

The agency estimates that, on the average, over the past decade the Soviet Union has increased its mil itary spending by 3 percent annually in dollars and about 4 percent in rubles. (Growth in rubles has been larger than growth in dollars because an increasing proportion of Soviet growth has been in high-technology weapons systems, rather than manpower; translated into dollar equivalents, technology is relatively cheaper than manpower in the United States,

Representative Les Aspin (D., Wis.) is a member of the House Armed Services Committee; he worked as an analyst in the Pentagon during the 1960s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ıile the opposite is true in the Soviet Union.)

The C.I.A. figures also show that the Soviet Union's ilitary spending growth has not been constant, but s fluctuated considerably. In seven of the past ten ars, growth was less than 3 percent. This shows at Soviet leaders have not built any set growth fig-e into the military budget. On the contrary, the rate growth has been subject to cyclical fluctuations in eir weapons procurement and modernization pro-ams.

If there is no steady rate of increase in Soviet mil-ary spending that the United States need keep up ith, the key question becomes, to what extent does ıe growth in Soviet military spending directly ıreaten NATO? The C.I.A.'s figures show that be-veen 1967 and 1977, only 15 percent of the Soviet nion's total real growth was NATO-related, both ı rubles and dollars. Expenditures relating to the de-ense of the border with China constituted 45 percent f the real growth in dollars and 35 percent in rubles.

When research and development expenditures are actored in, the NATO-related figure goes to 30 to 35 ercent. Still, the lion's share of growth was allocated o the Chinese border. This is not surprising because nost intelligence analysts say that the Soviet Union erceives the Chinese as its number-one threat. Be-ween 1967 and 1971, for example, the number of di-isions deployed by the Soviet Union in the Far East vas doubled (from twenty to forty) and tactical air orces were increased fivefold.

According to Secretary Brown, a "substantial por-ion" of the NATO-related increases was prompted by a desire to recover ground lost because of "cheap rocket deterrence" policies during the early 1960s, when Nikita Khrushchev emphasized nuclear mis-siles and tried to recycle the savings from reduced spending on ground forces into consumer goods. Mil-itary spending in the post-Khrushchev era in the So-viet Union was analogous to the United States' in the Kennedy years, when we shifted from "massive retal-iation" to "flexible response," strengthening conven-tional forces instead of relying on nuclear weapons alone to deter Soviet expansionism.

It is thus highly questionable whether the Soviet Union's rate of real growth should be a direct factor in how the United States plans its own defense budget. But what of the effect of the 3 percent real growth figure on our own military power? To ascer-tain this we must first determine what the escalator clause is based on. In other words, 3 percent of what? Here the Carter Administration has been straightfor-ward. It intends the 3 percent growth to apply to the entire defense budget, not just the part of it that re-lates to NATO. It also means it to apply to outlays—that is, money actually spent during the year—rather than to the money appropriated by Congress. It also says that the 1979 base figure includes the Adminis-tration's requested $2.16 billion in supplemental ap-propriations in the fiscal 1979 budget.

The decision to apply the 3 percent increase to the total defense budget carries a certain historical irony. In 1971 and 1972, when several members of Congress, notably Senator Mike Mansfield, attempted to reduce NATO spending by withdrawing some American troops from Europe, then-Secretary of Defense Mel-vin Laird assured them that the total costs of the NATO commitment—including support and naval supply costs—amounted to only $14 billion, or 17.7 percent of the authorized budget for 1972. Now, in justifying a 3 percent increase because of allegedly pressing NATO needs, the Pentagon finds that virtu-ally everything in the defense budget relates to NATO.

Actually, a more realistic appraisal would be that about $38.6 billion of the 1979 budget (30 percent) and $42.4 billion of the 1980 budget is "NATO-force-related"—that is, directly contributing to the combat effectiveness of the alliance. In terms of appropria-tions, which defense-minded Congressmen argue are more relevant than outlays as an indicator of defense commitment, there is an increase of 10.1 percent in NATO-force-related spending in the 1980 budget over the 1979 budget. Allowing for the officially an-ticipated inflation rate on manufactured equipment of 7 percent (already outmoded), real growth comes to 3.1 percent. The NATO-related increase in outlays also exceeds 3 percent. If, as the Administration claims, the purpose of the 3 percent growth figure is to shore up NATO defenses, this can be accomplished and the remaining 70 percent of the total defense budget still be cut.

The budget contains numerous items whose real growth will not increase our military capability in general, much less our NATO contribution. More than 50 percent of the authorized spending in the 1979 budget is allocated for such things as military and civilian payrolls ($46.6 billion), retirement pay ($10.1 billion), on down to such items as "contingencies" ($2.5 million), "XIII Winter Olympics" ($1.9 million) and "White House Helicopter" ($1.9 million). All such items should be set aside from the budget before calculating the 3 percent real growth, since any growth in expendi-tures on them is militarily meaningless (and indeed, if it involves military and civilian pay increases, might run counter to the President's anti-inflation guidelines).

An item-by-item breakdown of the budget in terms of actual military hardware also yields up expendi-tures that have little impact on NATO. Take two items from the 1980 budget—$1.5 billion for a single Trident nuclear ballistic-missile submarine and $77 million for 16,805 TOW anti-tank guided missiles. Those TOW missiles will augment the strength of NATO forces far more than will that single Trident sub, but both are considered in setting the growth figure.

Actually, the rigidity of the 3 percent escalator clause could encourage unnecessary spending. Con-sider the category budgeteers call postponements and deferrals. This rubric refers to Congressional cuts in

-LICENSED-TO-UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appropriations in one particular year that do not reduce the overall program. For example, the Defense Department requests fifteen bombers this year and fifteen next year; Congress might decide to schedule the thirty new bombers over three years, at the rate of ten a year. The end result is not different, but the budget totals in any particular year are changed. Then there are financial adjustments—trims largely made at the Pentagon's own request. An example of this category is money for recruiting. The Navy might find that it has so many enlistments early in the year that it no longer needs as much recruiting money as it requested.

But if the budget is tied to a rigid rate of increase, these normal adjustments during the course of the year could have the effect of reducing the real growth in a particular year. The Defense Department might then hesitate to tell Congress about delays and cancellations in weapons programs, for fear that the resulting cuts would put the real growth figure below 3 percent. Or the Defense Department might react to such normal cuts by requesting a supplemental appropriation to bring the outlay or the appropriation figures (or both) back up to the mark.

The point of all this is that policies based on preordained dollar amounts can easily lead to a kind of fetishism that induces spending for spending's sake. As a believer in zero-based budgeting, President Carter should know better than anyone that concern for efficiency lapses within the bureaucracy when an agency has a high spending quota to achieve, and waste is the result.

Finally, what if the inflation rate exceeds that assumed by the Administration in calculating its real growth increase—as has already happened this year? If the overall inflation rate on the military hardware the Department of Defense purchases is 10 percent, rather than the assumed 7 percent, the 3 percent real growth is wiped out. NATO Governments could accuse us of reneging on our promise, even though the level and quality of military forces funded in the budget would be precisely the same. Such is the absurdity and potential political danger of concentrating on particular dollar amounts rather than the actual military forces they are purchasing and what these can accomplish.

Budget analysis is a very arcane procedure, but there is no obfuscating the fact that aggregate budget totals reveal nothing about what is in those budgets; nor does 3 percent real growth represent a meaningful symbol of our commitment to the NATO alliance. Commitments to an alliance—or any military purpose—should be based not on static indicators but on specific programs and capabilities and how well they perform and are adapted to their purposes. A detailed breakdown of the 1980 budget by specific items clearly shows that the United States is making great efforts to augment NATO strength—as it has been doing in the past few years.

To kneel before the altar of 3 percent real growth—to hold any number as sacrosanct—is to blindly w ship symbols rather than comprehending the realit they represent. Emphasis on percentage growth verts attention from the real world of weapons s tems, capabilities and mission requirements—short, from what defense policy should be about.

Gasohol

(Continued From Front Cover)

further excesses. And it did. OPEC oil ministe meeting on March 25, were caustically critical their cartel partners, the Seven Sisters of Big Oil, f their price-gouging retail practices—and so, havi partially justified themselves, they voted another percent increase, with members free to impose cost surcharges on top of that. The previous OPEC ba price of $13.35 a barrel was raised to $14.54, but su charges were expected to add $4 a barrel, perha more, to that inflated price.

The impact on a national economy already beir decimated by rampant inflation cannot help but l disastrous. It is the inevitable consequence of a energy policy as riddled with fallacies as Herbe Hoover's prescription for fighting the Depression.

Fallacy Number 1. The Carter Administration persistent effort to drive oil prices higher in hopes stimulating conservation was doomed on the face of to cost more than it could possibly save. Since petr leum is the base of virtually everything we use i modern society (electricity, lipsticks and cleansin creams, tires and road surfaces, clothing, plastic chemicals, you name it), the high-price energy polic could not help but fuel inflation. Since 15 percent all energy is consumed on the farms (the figure is E xon Corporation's), it was inevitable that food price already high, would simply go through the roc again; and the 1967 dollar, already worth less than 5 cents, would begin its plunge toward a quarter.

Fallacy Number 2. Meaningful conservation is an il lusion and an impossibility in the sprawling, dispersed suburban society we have developed since World Wa II. People *have* to drive to get to work; they *have* to drive to shop. Our huge shopping malls are located on out of-town highways, accessible only to shoppers brough by car; our countrysides are pocked with electronic and industrial plants set down in what used to be roll ing hills and cornfields. Southern California withou the car and the freeway would strangle. The same is true of the northwestern Maryland countryside, of New Jersey, Connecticut, of almost any area of the country. American Telephone & Telegraph's largest long-distance trouble-shooting facility is set down in Bedminster, N.J., the heart of horse country. A major

Fred J. Cook is a journalist and author whose latest work, Storm Before Dawn, *is a Revolutionary War novel (Condor Press).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RCA Corporation installation is located in Findlay, Ohio, some 45 miles south of Toledo. A relative living and working there gives this picture, one typical of modern America: "There is no mass transit in Findlay. There was until about fifteen years ago, but with the advent of two cars per family, it went out of existence. There is only one bus a day to and from Toledo. Car pools for such as RCA [workers] are impractical due to spread-out living locations. . . ." Even if "sacrifice and conservation" achieved a 10 percent fuel saving—and not a single expert I talked to thinks that is even remotely possible—the gain becomes a loss when OPEC prices jump and oil on the spot market is bringing $23 a barrel.

Fallacy Number 3. The higher prices so avidly sought by the "Jimmy who?" now exposed as "Jimmy Hoover" simply do not insure the development of new oil wells. Mobil Oil Corporation puts a hefty portion of its windfall profits *not into* oil wells but *into* Montgomery Ward & Company stocks instead. The big oil companies, seeking to insure their energy monopoly in the future, simply extend their grasp into other potential energy fields—coal, shale, uranium—ready to reap more fortunes once prices are driven high enough. In the meantime, the soaring spot market prices are seized upon as an excuse to jack up the prices of oil in inventory, creating windfall profits. Some statistics: the profits of American businesses soared 26 percent last year, an inflationary spiral that Alfred Kahn, President Carter's anti-inflation chief, called "a catastrophe." At the same time, fourth-quarter oil profits outstripped the profits of all other American businesses by 25 percent. Yet American oil companies have been drilling less and less. The Hughes Tool Company, the industry source on such matters, reported in late March that domestic drilling had declined for nine weeks in succession, and was running about 8 percent behind the 1978 pace.

In this perspective, plain common sense, a quality that one assumes must exist somewhere in the Carter Administration, says that the only way the nation could have coped with the President's "moral equivalent of war" would have been to throw its energies into a Manhattan-type project to develop *cheaper* sources of energy—and sources plentiful, inexhaustible and renewable within our own country.

The question, then, is just *who* runs the Administration and the country? It is a question that must be answered before one can even begin to consider the practical possibilities of alternative energy sources.

Jack Anderson, the Washington columnist, has charged that, when Carter was running for President, he realized he could never be elected unless he made a pact with the oil barons of Texas and Oklahoma. And so, Anderson says, a bargain was struck. Or perhaps it was merely a gentleman's agreement. Either way, the existence of such a compact between the President and Big Oil seems consistent with the actions he has taken.

During the bitter winter of 1976-77, natural gas supplies were so inadequate that many factories in the industrial Middle West had to shut down and thousands of workers were thrown out of jobs. Asked about well-substantiated reports that major companies were "holding back" natural gas deliveries, hoping to force decontrol and reap higher prices, President Carter said, in effect, that was business; you couldn't blame businessmen for seeking a larger profit.

In a press conference on January 18, 1979, a reporter reminded the President that he had just expressed concern about inflation. In this context, was it still his intention "to propose some variation of the wellhead tax, or take some other action that would have the effect of raising domestic oil prices?"

"Ultimately," said Jimmy Hoover, "domestic oil prices will have to be raised, substantially. . . ."

The issue wouldn't go away. In a press conference,



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

January 26, the President was pinned with this question:

"Mr President, the fourth-quarter profits are out for the big oil companies, and I don't want to mention names, but they reached 48 percent, 72 percent, 44 percent, 134 percent. Given the fact you've asked the country to make sacrifices, prepare for lean and austere years, I was wondering if you'd give us some reaction to those profits—profits of that size when American workers are being asked to hold wage increases to 7 percent."

The President stumbled around on this one, and it must be said in all sadness that he never quite answered the question: who is to sacrifice? He rambled on about the new energy bill having made more natural gas available to American consumers (it flooded the market as soon as his prized energy bill sanctioned price escalation, though he didn't mention this), and he remarked vaguely that "above a certain point in earnings, of course, the income tax levies against *even the oil companies are partially adequate*." (Italics added.)

In none of these press conference rejoinders nor in his latest energy speech of April 5, despite its rhetoric about a tough tax on "windfall" profits, does one find the slightest trace of human concern about the welfare or the sufferings or the sacrifices of the average citizens.

There are others who are far more concerned about the human toll. James L. Larocca, commissioner of the New York State Energy Office, is one. A spokesman for Larocca expresses deep concern about the "week-to-week" jump in heating-oil prices. Well he might. In New Jersey, the price I pay for heating oil has risen 20 percent, from 49.9 cents to 59.9 cents per gallon, between April 1978 and March 1979. Larocca's spokesman says: "This is a very, very distressing situation, and we are extremely worried about it since in New York we use so much oil to heat, and this is a very bad situation for the poor and the elderly."

He pointed out that *The Wall Street Journal* had just carried a page-one story headlined: "Cost of Keeping Warm Poses a Real Hardship to Millions of the Poor." *The Journal*'s article said that many poor and elderly "must choose between heating and eating," and added: "Each winter, many people simply freeze to death." The Carter Administration's oft-repeated plea to turn the thermostat down can be a lethal prescription for the elderly, thousands of whom die each year from "accidental hypothermia," a rapid drop in body temperature that can be fatal.

This is the reality that the President defies when he insists on gradual decontrol and, eventually, complete decontrol of petroleum prices. As Commissioner Larocca's aide pointed out, heating-oil prices jumped 37.3 percent between decontrol in July 1976 and February 15, 1979. They have risen by leaps and bounds since February 15; but even if one takes that cutoff date, the increase has been double that of the Consumer Price Index. This experience seems a clear indication of what would happen under full decontrol.

Given this crisis, logic suggests that the Federal Government should have devoted its efforts to finding alternative sources of fuel, the only way to give OPEC and Big Oil the kind of competition on which the free enterprise system supposedly is based. But when Scott Skylar began asking questions four years ago, he found himself running into the stone wall that Big Oil had erected in the bureaucracy.

The experts in the Energy Research and Development Administration, which was later absorbed into the Department of Energy, parroted the lines furnished by the American Petroleum Institute, the industry's authorized apologist. Gasohol (a mixture of 90 percent gasoline and 10 percent alcohol) wouldn't work, they said, because alcohol doesn't have the B.T.U.s (British thermal units) that gasoline does, and so you would only be diluting your real energy source by using it.

"Everytime I suggested something, they had the answers why it wouldn't work," Skylar says. "They were the experts, and I figured they must be right. Some Nebraska gasohol advocates gave me some statistics that seemed to show that gasohol did work, that it gave even better mileage than pure gasoline, but when I went back to ERDA, they shot those figures down, too.

"Then a friend of mine in the Ford Motor Company told me about experiments that Volkswagen had run. I found Volkswagen had run literally hundreds of tests using different blends of gasoline and alcohol, and even pure alcohol. Their tests showed that alcohol really worked well. I went back to ERDA, and they gave me the old story about B.T.U.s—they never seemed to be able to think about anything but B.T.U.s—and they showed me some very inadequate data that had been furnished by the Petroleum Institute on tests that had been run on just seven cars. This made me mad."

Skylar did some further research, and he found that, while alcohol has only about two-thirds the B.T.U.s per gallon that gasoline does, it has "a much greater thermal efficiency. It is 1.4 times more efficient than gasoline in its direct conversion to power."

One great deterrent to the use of alcohol is its cost. It is not price competitive with gasoline even at today's inflated prices. Scott Skylar, for example, pays a gasohol dealer in Alexandria, Va., $1.20 a gallon for the alcohol he uses in his demonstration Rambler. But the reason alcohol prices today are so high is obvious; the availability of grain alcohol has been ignored. Modern alcohol is derived from petroleum, and either petroleum or natural gas is used to fuel the distilling process. Thus the Department of Energy can say truthfully, to a point, that the energy used to make alcohol costs far more than the energy produced is worth. But what happens when, instead of using the most costly substances in our economy, alcohol is made from the surplus corn or waste products of our farms and industry? And what happens when solar energy, not natural gas or petroleum, is used in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the distilling process?

Lance Crombie, a Minnesota scientist turned farmer, has supplied some answers. Crombie is a former cancer researcher with a Ph.D. in microbiology. He is chairman of the Minnesota Heart Fund, an associate professor of pharmacology at the University of Minnesota and a member of the New York Academy of Sciences. He also grows corn and wheat on his 600-acre farm in Webster, Minn.

When heating-oil prices jumped in the winter of 1976-77, Crombie found himself paying $450 just to heat his large brick house for the month of January. Such staggering monthly charges threatened to bankrupt him, and so he decided to put his scientific knowledge to use. The result, after some experimentation, was a cheap, homemade, solar-powered still. Crombie had 45,000 bushels of corn sitting in his bins that he could not market. The corn had cost him $2 a bushel to grow, and the going price was only $1.60. Instead of taking such a loss, Crombie decided to use his corn to make alcohol. Since he was using solar energy, not expensive fuels, Crombie came up with these results:

A bushel of corn produced 5 gallons of alcohol.

A mash called D.D.G.S. that resulted from the fermentation is ideal for feeding livestock, and Crombie could sell this mash for $2, just what it had cost him to grow the corn.

Costs of producing the 5 gallons of alcohol came to just 10 cents a gallon, and the alcohol could easily be sold for 50 cents a gallon. Deducting his total costs of $2.50, Crombie found he had a $2 profit on his five gallons. Crombie, however, wasn't interested in selling his alcohol. He wanted to use the fuel to run his car, his tractor, his other farm equipment—and to heat his home. His solar-powered still now accomplishes all of these objectives at minimal cost and inconvenience.

To heat his home, Crombie uses a 70 percent alcohol, 30 percent water solution (the water, he says, stretches the alcohol so that you end up consuming less alcohol than fuel oil for the same amount of heat). To use this mixture, Crombie increased the size of his furnace's fuel nozzle about 25 percent and adjusted the air valve to "tune in" the flame. When this was done, he found that his alcohol burned with a clean, hot, almost invisible yellow fire. A similar slight adjustment was needed to enlarge the main fuel jet in his car's carburetor—and Crombie was virtually free from his bondage to Big Oil.

Alcohol, Crombie insists, is the easiest fuel to produce and the least dangerous. It can be made from almost anything—waste paper, wood pulp, fruits, pumpkins, sugar cane, sugar beets—even from the refuse of canning and cheese plants and plain household garbage. Sugar beets, Crombie says, could provide an ideal energy source for a farmer who wants to produce his own fuel, and he estimates that 5 acres of sugar beets could be turned into a whole year's supply of alcohol.

There are other advantages. The biggest extra dividend from the national standpoint could be putting all our available farm land to work. Crombie points out that the Federal Government now pays farmers $22 billion a year *not* to plant millions of acres of farm land, limiting production so as not to glut the market. Crombie thinks all available acreage should be planted fence post to fence post; the surplus crops not needed for food should be turned into alcohol for energy, and then the Arabs and Big Oil wouldn't have a monopolistic field day at the national expense.

Does it sound too simple a solution to be valid? Well, Brazil for years now has been revamping its economy along the very lines that Crombie suggests—and has been doing so with phenomenal success. When the first OPEC energy crunch hit the Western industrialized world in 1973, Brazil, unlike the United States, turned quickly to the production of alcohol as an alternative fuel. Sugar cane, the manioc root and other tropical plants were fermented; alcohol was produced, and Brazil became the world leader in promoting this alternative to petroleum blackmail.

Brazil's National Alcohol Commission has approved some 170 projects and earmarked $800 million for biomass conversion and engine modification efforts. Last year, Brazil produced and consumed some 685 million gallons of ethyl alcohol as a gasoline substitute or supplement. Production is expected to reach 1 billion gallons annually in 1980 when gasoline pumps will be allowed to offer only two choices—gasohol or alcohol. By 1981, the president of the Brazilian Automotive Manufacturers' Association predicts, more than 16 percent of the 1 million cars annually manufactured will be equipped with engines to burn only alcohol.

Brazil's experience has demonstrated (as, indeed, have test projects in this country) that alcohol has several advantages over gasoline. It does leave a slight odor, especially when a car is idling, but it burns cooler, cleaner and more efficiently, giving virtually the same mileage as gasoline without spewing out lead or sulfur pollutants. Hydrocarbons are reduced to negligible levels.

It would seem that if Brazil could accomplish so much, the United States, with its vaunted scientific and technological expertise, should have been at least able to match the performance. Except that Big Oil stood in the way. As Scott Skylar found out, the ERDA and its successor, the Department of Energy, both had mind-sets against alternative energy sources. One simple fact illustrates how deep and pervasive was this oil-induced mental block: in President Carter's energy message of April 5, 1979 there is just one tepid sentence devoted to the possibilities of alcohol fuels. ("We can produce more gasohol, already being used to replace gasoline in several states.")

Dr. Schlesinger's D.O.E. did virtually nothing until the fall of 1977 when seventy-three Senators and Representatives—Senators Birch Bayh and Frank Church prominent among them—wrote Schlesinger and Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland urging "a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

major national commitment" to the development of fuels from agricultural and forest products. Only then did the sluggish Federal bureaucracy begin to stir. The 1978 budget finally allotted a meager $5 million for "fuels from biomass" research. This figure was increased to $15.4 million in 1979, and an additional $3.9 million was appropriated for research on automotive engines using gasohol.

Senator Bayh got a bill passed by the last Congress to create a National Alcohol Fuels Commission, which he heads. He was also instrumental in the passage of a bill that waives the 4-cents-a-gallon Federal excise tax on alcohol fuels derived from agricultural or forest products. (Ten states have followed this lead by revoking state taxes on such fuels.)

Senator Church has sponsored a bill requiring the Energy Secretary to establish a program to replace gasoline with gasohol and mandating that 1 percent of all United States motor fuel production consist of gasohol by 1981. The mandated percentage would increase to 5 percent by 1985 and 10 percent by 1990. Critics have contended that Senator Church's program is too ambitious, that such goals cannot be met in the specified time frames. But one has to wonder, in light of the foot-dragging official record, whether the real reason is that Big Oil, which has been lobbying for decontrol and higher petroleum prices, does not *want* them to be met.

One thing is certain, progress is being made out in the Middle West and Southern farm belts. The State of Nebraska, which has pioneered in alcohol research, plans to build a 20-million-gallon-a-year alcohol plant to further the use of gasohol. A family farmer in South Dakota, using conventional methods, is distilling approximately 70 gallons a day at a cost of roughly 45 cents, a price that is reduced by revenue from the wet mash byproduct sold as feed for livestock.

Farm cooperatives are spurring the use of gasohol. The Indiana Farm Bureau Co-op, which has its own facilities for producing alcohol, reported on March 1 that its sixty county associations had sold 1,237,519 gallons of gasohol in the first two months of this year. The Southwest Farmers Co-op in Selma, Ala., is also distilling its own alcohol. In Peoria, Ill., a commercial firm, Technical Industrial Products, which supplies many Midwestern outlets, plans to boost its alcohol producing capacity from 624,000 gallons a year to 11 million gallons. And a Bayh proposal encouraging farmers to grow energy crops on set-aside acreage without losing their Federal subsidies is now law.

Such are the signs of a rapidly growing grass-roots movement that may eventually prove too potent for even the lobbyists of Big Oil to squelch. If so, the Carter Administration and all its so-called energy experts will have been dragged kicking and screaming to acceptance of a policy like Brazil's that would reduce the nation's utter dependence on OPEC and would act as a deterrent on the inflationary pricing policies of OPEC's Big Oil cartel partners. □

THE FUND FOR NEW PRIORITIES INVITES YOU. . .

in New York

to a discussion with Congressman Ted Weiss (at a wine/cheese reception) on---

"Should the U.S. Normalize Relations and Recognize Vietnam?"

5-7 p.m.
Sunday, April 29th
Carnegie International Center
(345 East 46th Street, 2nd fl.)

$10 per person
$15 per couple

N.B. A representative from the Vietnam government has been invited to participate.

on Capitol Hill

to a Congressional Colloquy, chaired by U.S. Senator Paul Tsongas (Democrat-Mass.) on---

"U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia"

12-2 p.m.
Thursday, April 26th,
in the Capitol Building

A representative from the U.S. State Department, as well as an outside-government expert, have been invited to participate.

A transcript will be available for $3.

Advance Reservations Only

For further details, please write/phone---
Fund for New Priorities in America
122 East 42nd Street
New York, New York 10017
#212-697-2282

ALL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE TAX-DEDUCTIBLE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & THE ARTS.

Nowhere to Go but Down

DAVID GORDON

THE SECOND SLUMP: A Marxist Analysis of Recession in the Seventies. *By Ernest Mandel. New Left Books. 212 pp. $12.95.*

For most economists at least, hopefulness is the parent of superficial invention. The Government is preparing for a national election? Let's fashion an econometric manual for optimistic projections! The country needs to improve its terms of trade? Let's demonstrate (patriotically) our specific national immunity to world economic malaise! Playing the role of court cheerleaders, mainstream economists specialize in cheerful forecasts. That helps explain their corollary specialization in useless and misguided analyses of economic instability.

Two groups of economists manage to transcend this situational shallowness and to promote much more penetrating views of the current situation in the world economy . . . for parallel reasons.

One group works more or less directly for the leading multinational corporations and banks. It includes large banks' leading economists, research staff at national corporate think tanks like The Conference Board in the United States, and analysts at international institutions like the World Bank and the Organization for European Cooperation and Development. International capital cannot afford to tolerate shortsighted apologetics or misguided analysis. Because they can pay upon delivery, they get what they want. And what they get consistently represents the interests of an economic class driven to plan beyond national boundaries and short-term business cycles.

The second group works at a disadvantage—without much institutional funding, research support or public assistance. It is made up of international Marxist economists who aim to trace and represent the economic interests of working people around the world and who hope to transcend the national and temporal shortsightedness that organizational and electoral politics tend to cultivate. (I use the term "international Marxists" to emphasize that "national Marxist" economists are just as susceptible to myopia as court cheerleaders among the bourgeoisie.) They write lonesome books and articles. Because capitalists are more internationally oriented than most large unions, international Marxists receive far less support and publicity from the class organizations they hope to represent than their mainstream counterparts. Their analyses nonetheless explore the foundations of the world economy and the fundamental dynamics of its prosperity and instability. Their works express an international economic class viewpoint as surely as the recent publications of the Trilateral Commission.

Along with Paul Sweezy, André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and less than a handful of others, the Belgian Ernest Mandel has sustained this international Marxist economic perspective for nearly a generation. (Fortunately for them and all of us, a younger and much larger generation of international Marxist economists is beginning to carry their torch.) Mandel has always sought the broadest and longest view of the world economy. As often as any other economist whose works I know, he has displayed remarkably acute and accurate economic foresight.

Since we live in turbulent economic times and since most economists have been suffocating us with their own confusion for years, Mandel's new book on the character of the current economic crisis deserves special attention—particularly in the United States, where Marxism still suffers from malign neglect. (McCarthyism lives on. Mandel was denied a visitor's visa until only a year ago, and André Gunder Frank is still being denied entry into the United States on spurious political grounds.)

Judging Mandel's book in this context, I find it both a challenge and a disappointment.

The Second Slump studies the current crisis of the world capitalist economy, tracing its instability and sputtering recovery from the acute recession of 1973-75 through the beginning of 1978. Despite the title's suggestion, Mandel does not systematically compare the current period with the Depression of the 1930s. (The English title is puzzling; the original German, literally translated as *End of Crisis or Crisis Without End?*, much more accurately captures the focus and argument of the book.) Mandel builds his analysis from an astonishing breadth of information about the world economy, comparing trends among at least eleven advanced countries, consistently citing sources in at least four languages. He aims precisely to probe the logic of a system that spills beyond individual national boundaries and whose dynamics therefore elude the grasp of isolated national governments.

Mandel's analysis fundamentally challenges the conventional wisdom of mainstream United States economists, happily reified by the media, in five important ways.

First, Mandel helps dislodge the convenient misperception that the crisis involves problems solely of inflation and unemployment. (Were that true, it might even be plausible to expect that we could solve our current economic problems with conventional policy tools.) Marshaling data from all the advanced capitalist countries, Mandel shows that the current crisis also involves problems of stagnant investment, mounting conflict between workers and corporations, monetary and financial instability, incipient tariff protectionism and dissolving trade relationships. This perspective on the *extended* dimensions of the crisis seems absolutely essential for even launching a useful analysis of its character and dynamics.

Second, Mandel effectively demolishes the casual identification of oil and food price hikes in 1973-75 as the "sources" and therefore the "causes" of the crisis. He shows that the world economy had begun to come apart at the seams in the late 1960s, long before the coincidental disruptions of the early 1970s. (Mandel, more than others, can safely argue with such clear hindsight, since he largely predicted the character of the present crisis in his previous book, *Late Capitalism*, first published in German in 1972.) The roots of the current crisis go much deeper than conventional accounts, based on the singular impact of "exogenous shocks" to the economy, are capable of suggesting.

Third, Mandel also refutes the superficial "single-factor" analyses so popular among mainstream economists—interpretations that "blame" the current instability on bad political deci-

David Gordon teaches economics at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sions about taxes during the Vietnam War or greedy Arab oil sheiks or accelerating "rational expectations" about inflationary prices or fiscal crises caused by what *Fortune* has called "social welfare drag." Mandel shows that several important causes have "conjoined," to use a phrase more common in European social science circles than in the United States, to create and intensify the crisis. These causes include: excess capacity caused by overinvestment during the 1950s and 1960s; intensification of international competition among large corporations from the major advanced countries; disproportionate expansion and contraction among industrial sectors; the erosion of the imperialistic hegemony of the "first" world, and particularly the United States, over the third world, and the growing capacity of the organized working class throughout the advanced world to resist intensive exploitation in production.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, Mandel demonstrates the obviously international character of the current crisis. Americans aren't the only nationals who study their economic problems through domestic lenses, believing that they can solve them independently of actions in other countries. Most British, German, French and Italian economists also make this mistake. Mandel shows clearly that all the advanced capitalist economies are suffering *common* problems more or less simultaneously. (Indeed, he argues that one of the most important sources of the intensity of the current crisis is the convergence of the short-term business cycles among the advanced countries.) If all the other countries in the world capitalist economy are suffering the same problems at the same time, how long can we complacently ascribe our problems to the economic policies of our own politicians and corporate officials? Is it not time to recognize that our problems derive from the character of the world economic system that knits together these separate national economic units?

Fifth, and most challenging to defenders of the capitalist faith, Mandel presents two kinds of arguments which systematically ascribe the character of the current crisis to the character of capitalism itself, not to outside events or political mistakes or a series of coincidental accidents. On one side, Mandel argues that the character of the current crisis is consistent with traditional Marxian arguments that capitalism tends toward crisis as a result of its own internal logic—that, indeed, it would be astonishing if capitalism were able to avoid crisis for very long at all. (This book is not the place where readers unfamiliar with Marxian economics can find an exposition of those general arguments. One might most easily begin with a book edited by the Union for Radical Political Economics, *U.S. Capitalism in Crisis*, distributed by Monthly Review Press, New York City.) On the other side, Mandel shows that all advanced "socialist" economies, despite their many faults, have nonetheless withstood the instability and misfiring of the capitalist countries, growing steadily throughout the current period, maintaining stable rates of productive investment. Capitalism must have something to do with those differences.

Two of these arguments also provide serious challenges to many United States Marxist economists as well: too many still tend to think in terms of single-factor theories of crisis (as Mandel himself notes), searching for the magic telegram which provides a unique and universal explanation of all sources of instability in capitalist economies. Too many also still think in national terms, failing to keep pace with the boundaries of a system that not only spills across national borders but fundamentally operates on a world scale. Mandel helps close the case on those partial and limited perspectives, challenging all of us to extend our thinking to the broad horizons and complex perspectives he seeks to apply himself.

Beyond these obvious challenges, Mandel's book disappoints me in two respects, both of them consistent with some of the limitations of his earlier work.

The first disappointment is more stylistic than substantive. Mandel leads a fully integrated life as a social scientist, journalist and political activist. His writing interweaves those three kinds of perspectives in a seamless and ultimately confusing way. He moves back and forth among journalistic description, political argument and "analytic" hypothesis with astonishing and virtually breathless ease. (Few others are even *capable* of attempting to integrate all three perspectives.) Even for someone familiar with his different modes of exposition, the transitions are frustrating; just as it appears that Mandel is beginning to develop a new and relatively rigorous argument about the sources of financial instability, he launches into a journalistic description of bank defaults that adds nothing to his argument and serves as completely inadequate "documentation" of his analysis. For those who are less familiar with the language of some of the traditional Marxian theory, much less the rhetoric of international Marxist politics, I suppose that the style of exposition will be annoying. I would simply encourage readers to stick with the book beyond and above those frustrations, for the challenges of his arguments are worth the occasional impatience.

The second disappointment is more substantive and more serious. Mandel, like his intellectual progenitor, Leon Trotsky, makes fairly sharp separations between the economic dynamics of capitalist economies and the political impact of tendencies and shifts in the force of the "class struggle." This relatively artificial separation leads him to exaggerate, as Trotsky also did, the "breakdown" tendencies of the system. *The Second Slump* so effectively dramatizes all of the instabilities and contradictions of the system that it implicitly conveys the impression of insolubility from the capitalists' side of the struggle. History has taught us as recently as the period during and immediately after World War II, however, that capitalists are capable of regrouping and seeking effective stabilization of the

They wanted to change the way people lived.

"*Co-ops, Communes & Collectives* offers vivid proof that the experiments of the sixties are neither irrelevant nor their participants a lost generation. In this lively, honest and hopeful volume, some of the most perceptive activists and critics of the Movement provide thoughtful insights into both the successes and failures of the period."—GAR ALPEROVITZ

"This is front-line social science, cogent and thought-provoking."—*Kirkus Reviews*

$15, cloth; $5.95, paper

CO-OPS, COMMUNES & COLLECTIVES

EXPERIMENTS IN SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE 1960s AND 1970s

Edited by JOHN CASE and ROSEMARY C. R. TAYLOR

PANTHEON

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contradictions to which the system exposes them. Mandel's analysis of the economy, because it builds so decisively upon "intrinsic" dynamics, does not properly prepare us for the connections between the economic character of the current crisis and the logic of the political responses which multinational corporations and banks are currently fashioning.

This raises the most important challenge of Mandel's work in general and this recent book in particular: to *overcome* the limitations which his analytic separation between economics and politics imposes. At the least, the current crisis should have reminded us forcefully that the *connections* between the "economic" problems capitalism throws our way and the range of "political" solutions it permits us are growing tighter every day. □

Out of the Modernist Box

LAWRENCE GRAUMAN Jr.

THE LITTLE MAGAZINE IN AMERICA: A Modern Documentary History. *Edited by Elliott Anderson and Mary Kinzie. The Pushcart Press. 770 pp. $25.*

In view of the traditional claims made for little magazines—that collectively they have nurtured and preserved, if not inspired, the essence of modern American writing, have supported the solitary creative impulse by keeping a distant and divided culture in touch with itself—it is surprising that they have so seldom been studied in much breadth or depth. Considerations of the value and significance of these publications—generally to be found in occasional issues of the journals themselves, in memoirs, or in the transcriptions of "symposiums"—tend to take one or another of three approaches: a brief exercise in literary, including intellectual, history; description, if not judgment, of a social "phenomenon" (cultural history); a critical response to artistic challenge (or pretension).

The most substantial work on the subject and the only book-length treatment for more than thirty years has been *The Little Magazine: A History and a Bibliography* by Frederick J. Hoffman and two colleagues. Although intensified by Hoffman's interest in psychoanalysis, this is a literary history, a discursive survey of the magazines and the movements from the founding of *Poetry* (1912) through the fullest flowering of literary modernism in *The Little Review, The Dial, Broom, Blast, transition* and *Hound and Horn.*

Page for page, probably the most intelligent and persuasive analysis of the meaning of literary magazines in the first half of this century is a pamphlet by Reed Whittemore, *Little Magazines* (1963) published in the University of Minnesota series on American Writers, which manages to combine both literary criticism and a good deal of important intellectual history in less than fifty pages.

The Little Magazine in America: A Modern Documentary History is neither a work of academic literary history nor of cultural theory nor of literary criticism, though it includes unbalanced quantities of all three among and within its essays, memoirs, manifestoes, interviews, photographs (many of them enhancing, most taken by Gerard Malanga) and in its annotated bibliography. This project began as a special issue of *TriQuarterly*, itself one of the biggest, best and most widely distributed little magazines. The editors, Elliott Anderson and Mary Kinzie, asked Bill Henderson, sole proprietor of The Pushcart Press, to write a piece on self-publishing for their collection, and Henderson eventually became so involved in the project that he has co-published the issue as a book—a huge and handsome one.

Anderson's intention was to produce a "companion" to Hoffman's earlier study, bringing it up to date; there has been a 1,000 percent increase, approximately, in the number of little magazines published over the past three decades, with at least 1,500 of them "appearing" now—or yesterday. His method, or probably his recourse, was to solicit contributions from a variety of writers, editors and critics, and to reprint some previously published introductions and interviews. The result, a "documentary" history (if taken in the sense that William Stott uses it in *Documentary Expression and Thirties America*, this is probably accurate), has

Lawrence Grauman Jr. was for five years editor of the late Antioch Review. *He has published several essays on the conditions of little magazines and American culture.*

The Education of Carey McWilliams
by Carey McWilliams

"Carey McWilliams doesn't cash in on trends, he makes them."—Nicholas von Hoffman

In the classic tradition of *The Education of Henry Adams* and *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens*, books that capture an entire period of American history through one man's life, Carey McWilliams has written a book destined to become required reading for anyone interested in 20th-century America.

Whenever and wherever social injustice flourished, McWilliams was there, to write about it and to fight it: the plight of the migrant workers; the forced internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II; the McCarthy witch-hunt; segregation in the South. His previous books—*Factories in the Field, Ill Fares the Land, Brothers Under the Skin*—and his twenty years as editor of *The Nation* changed the conscience of America.

In a rich and moving new book, the author takes us through a Rocky Mountain youth; surging California in the 20s and 30s; war, then "peace"—a Cold War that has never really ended. *The Education of Carey McWilliams* is the chronicle of a national treasure. *Notes, bibliography, and index.*

May, $10.95. Simon & Schuster



OUR PRICE $10.00
SAVE, ORDER NOW
LEE PUBLICATIONS
518 ROCKDALE DR.
SAN FRANCISCO,
CA 94127

Send _____ book(s) at $10.00 each to:

Name _____

Street _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

CA residents add 60¢ per book sales tax.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

several virtues, but one of them is not the thoroughness and consistency afforded by a single governing intelligence. (As I've discovered to my own recurrent sorrow, the risk of awaiting an individual, governing intelligence to make integrated sense of the literary, social and cultural history of little magazines is that it's not likely ever to complete the job.)

In addition to the obvious limitations of this approach—some desirable contributors will have writer's block, or be in intensive care, or will be hostile to the conception or to the sponsors—Anderson and Kinzie have created some other problems for themselves, which are revealed in their brief introduction. "Our basic concern," they write, "has been for the *phenomenon* [there it is again] of little magazines—for the curious and oftentimes eccentric processes of the field—not for one or another interpretation of their collective merit, however congenial." Whatever else this statement may mean, it seems to indicate that close and sustained analysis of the literary value of current little magazines, considered in the mass or discretely, will be more or less incidental to the accomplishments of this work. On one page of their introduction, Anderson and Kinzie observe that it "is the determination of many editors and writers . . . to reject all paraphrase, to insist on the absolute inviolable idiosyncrasy of their endeavors. . . . The history of this period in little-magazine editing is one of egregious and splendid bias." But on the next page they ask, "Whom have we left out?" and answer themselves in these terms: "In quantity, a great many. In kind, not many at all."

Whatever its shortcomings or contradictions—probably unavoidable though still troublesome—this anthology offers a vivid, fascinating, panoramic view of the most turbulent and fugitive cottage industry extant. Someone once compared the experience of reading a variety of these magazines, say in one long sitting in the periodical room of a large library, to the sensation a scientist must have when he focuses his microscope and a swarm of cells leaps suddenly into view: the sheer spectacle of so much remote, invisible, complex life is astonishing. It is this sense of spectacle that *The Little Magazine in America* conveys so well: the comings and goings of the schools and factions and sects (the Beats, the blacks, the New York poets, the Black Mountain poets); the institutional eminences (John Crowe Ransom), the gurus (Pound of course, Ginsberg, Charles Olson), the wild men (Charles Bukowski, Seymour Krim); the shifting alliances, the incessant political conflict, the battles over censorship; the constant need and search for money, the principled quarrels over accepting support from foundations, universities, the Federal and state governments; the miscellaneous innocence and foolishness and vanity and utter drivel; the elegies and manifestoes and ringing declarations (once upon a time *Janus*, "a quarterly review of letters, thought and the new theology," appeared briefly in Washington, D.C., with the announcement that it was "sincerely and honestly devoted to the policy of having no policy. It symbolizes individualism gone loco and ideational freedom carried to a licentious excess.").

Although few contributors seem interested in the *dailiness* of editorial activity, the actual work (how is a particular issue put together, how are writers dealt with, how is a manuscript edited?), several memoirs in this collection succeed in rendering a sense of the personal motives—the ambitions, fears, excitements, disillusionments—that lead individuals into and out of little magazines. One such is Peter Michelson's colorful remembrance of *Big Table* and *Purple Sage*, and perhaps the most convincing of these is by James Boatwright, the courtly editor of *Shenandoah*, whose unassuming self-examination also serves as an antidote to the pontifical abstractions of the literary historian Lewis P. Simpson (*Southern Review*), and to the stringent prescriptions of Robert Boyers (editor of the excellent if austere *Salmagundi*). Or, as Reed Whittemore, in his memoir of *Furioso*, puts it: "Each writer has to work his way out of the box he grows up in and for a remarkable number of American writers that process has involved editing a little magazine."

It may be more an indication of how vast and varied is the subculture of little magazines than it is an impugnment of the knowledge or diligence of Anderson and Kinzie to observe how many significant editions and influential editors are neglected or simply unrepresented in these many pages. One of the most important magazines of the 1940s *Accent*, and one of the 1950s, *Contact* are barely mentioned. Ignored are the persistently miscellaneous *Yale Review* the elaborately theoretical *Arts in Society*, and *Malahat Review*, Canada's best little magazine. No one seems to remember the *New Orleans Poetry Journal* or *Monocle*, the only American journal of political satire that was actually funny. Nor is there any discussion of *Story*, one of the most distinguished magazines of short fiction and the only one wholly devoted to it—though *Story* does receive an entry in the Annotated Bibliography, which was very competently prepared by Peter Martin. Among the influential editors who speak not in these pages are Theodore Solotaroff (whose *New American Review* was probably the best eclectic literary publication in America within the past decade), Irving Howe (whose intellectual activity, including editing *Dissent*, can hardly be understated), Frederick Morgan (poet and editor of *Hudson Review*), Charles Newman (a brilliant and erratic novelist, critic, organizer and the creator of *TriQuarterly*) and Coburn Britton (publisher of the short-lived but surpassingly beautiful *Prose*).

Moreover, it may not be surprising that in a work devoted to the craft of editing there is little evidence of it here; many literary magazines, after all, have celebrated their "openness," by which is frequently meant an indifference to discrimination. The awareness of precedent, however, doesn't make easier reading of Theodore Weiss's boring, self-congratulatory, insufferably happy memoir of his three decades with

CHINA—THE SICK DRAGON
by
DOUG WARD

Translated from official China documents, unpublished in U.S.

China's economy "on verge of collapse." U.S. investments safe?

Uprisings near China border with Vietnam.

Startling long-time plot against the U.S.

Vivid details of long & continuing struggle for power in China.

All fully documented. $8 ppd 4th cl mail. Must pay with order.
SUNDOWNER SERVICES, 2559 47th Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94116.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why "open admissions" leads to closed doors.

Our schools, argues David Nasaw, "are social institutions dedicated *not* to meeting the self-perceived needs of their students but to preserving social peace and prosperity." Looking closely at three major reform movements that have swept American education since the 1830's, he shows why the expansion of schooling has failed to bring a corresponding expansion in opportunity. Distinctions like those between "academic" and "vocational" courses, he maintains, have created a mass education that emphasizes, rather than eradicates, socio-economic divisions. "This is history of education in its finest tradition....Carefully researched, well written, and even-handed, Nasaw's book is an important addition to the debate over the evolution of public education in the United States."—*Library Journal*

$13.95

SCHOOLED TO ORDER

A Social History of Public Schooling in the United States

David Nasaw

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

SINCE 1478

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the *Quarterly Review of Literature*. And the editors may have been so impressed with Bill Henderson's success as a do-it-yourself publisher that they neglected to notice he has trouble writing clear sentences. Finally, the repeated appearance of language like "input" and "a greater in-depth treatment" is simply inexcusable. Barbarism has always been a significant strain in the subculture of little magazines, but not *this* kind of barbarism.

Of all the issues that arise from the astonishing past and haunt the problematic future of little magazines, two of the most important are left unresolved here, and one of them is scarcely joined. That one is a result of the recent tendency of Americans to define themselves in response to, or to identify with, increasingly smaller subcultural fragments—a tendency toward an orgy of pluralism that includes primary self-definitions of almost every imaginable classification: by race, sex, age, geography, occupation, physical condition and, of course, economic circumstance. It is not clear to me whether the community of little magazines has anticipated, even influenced, this mass social development, as has so often been the case in the past, or whether it is hurrying to catch up; what *is* clear is that this new feudalism has produced an amazing number of writers and editors. The range of their magazines can perhaps be suggested by a few brief descriptions, quoted from a recent list of recipients of government funds, published by the Coordinating Council of Literary Magazines:

- *The Apalachee Quarterly*, "emphasizing work by artists in the Apalachee region of the South."
- *Ararat*, "publishes creative writing by Armenian-Americans," plus [an expansive catholic flourish here] "some work by non-Armenians."
- *Dark Waters*, "focuses on neglected ethnic writers in the Pacific Northwest."
- *Kuksu*, "a journal of backcountry writing that represents a community of poets who have chosen to live and work in rural and backcountry areas."
- *Mouth of the Dragon*, "a poetry quarterly printing work by openly gay men."
- *Slit Wrist*, "explores 20th-century urban existence through personal journals and diaries."
- *Metamorfosis*, "is an outlet for creative writing by Chicanos in the Northwest."
- *Raven's Bones Journal*, "prints creative writing by Alaska Natives. . . ."
- *Tailings*, "is an outlet for writers in the Superior Basin area of Michigan."
- *13th Moon*, "concerned *exclusively* with the work and viewpoint of women."

Now at its best, that is, at the height of modernist expression, the culture of the 20th century has broken past borders of nationhood, race and speech. The pattern has been characteristic: province ran up against metropolis, attenuated tradition was shaken by urban experiment—and the result was "that brilliant nervousness, that fierce and restless probing" we identify with modernist culture. Cavafy from the streets of Alexandria, Faulkner from the hills and villages of Mississippi, Sholom Aleichem from the east European *shtetl*, Eliot from a provincial Midwestern city, William Carlos Williams from a provincial Eastern city, Joyce from the rigid precincts of Dublin—our greatest 20th-century writers leave behind them, though finally they remain deeply formed by, the limitations of the provincial.

And if there is one strain, a tone, an awareness common to many of the memoirs in *The Little Magazine in America*, it is an elegiac acknowledgment of the passing of modernism. As Michael Anania writes, in the shrewdest and most illuminating essay of the collection, "Aesthetically most new magazines declare themselves to be

THE ANNIVERSARY

It's the first of May—
the last drops of rain are a payment
to the dust and yellow air.
The man beside me preserves dreams
in his dark folds. When the light
settles on the walls, he turns
restlessly as a saint
whose limbs are buried in different cities.
I loosen the fist of sheets,
the clouds move on and return.
After each breath,
he breathes again.

Hours ago, we drove back to town,
the sky contracted on all sides
bolting the branches along the road.
We drank to years of labor,
the ladder of love, to the corn
illumined, growing up into the dead
of night, the vineyards
glowing like spines.
We passed a woman outside a country bar;
under the awning with a cigarette,
she gave quickly to the streams
of alkali, small rivers
filling the furrows.

The possibilities are as endless
as watermarks in the dust.
But in town, it's only rain
and is gone. The first yeses sprout
in a patch of purple outside the window,
an elm bows over the universe
of our bed. Only the two of us,
and you're gone, staggering
into sleep like that senseless jay
through loops of gravel and wet leaves
to his home in the air.
It is as clear as vodka:

I want to wake you now,
saying let's drink up and get back
to the work we did so well last night,
saying as the earth says after rain
this one is on me.

Roberta Spear

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jobs

one view of a national issue facing the electric power industry.

The traditional goal of unlimited economic growth is being seriously questioned. In the backlash, the proposal for a no-growth economy is the extreme example of less-is-more thinking. But for those people in our society whose hopes for decent jobs and a better standard of living would be thwarted by a steady-state economy, less is irrefutably less.

Since energy is inextricably tied to economic growth and the resultant increased job market, we are vitally concerned with this debate. As public utilities, we must take a stand that we believe is in the best interests of all sectors of our society. To formulate our position, we undertook a two-year study, utilizing several computer forecasting models to examine the available growth options.

The study suggests rejection of both extremes: unlimited expansion and no-growth. The public interest can best be served through what might be called "quality growth"—a natural evolution of economic expansion that encompasses the constraints necessary to meet current energy problems but still permits the job opportunities that bring more of our citizens into the economic mainstream.

The historical perspective:

It is important to recognize that we are in a transitional period between two energy epochs, the fossil fuel age and the future energy era. Fuels are available to meet the world's predictable energy needs for billions of years! What we are short of is the technology to convert available fuel sources into working energy. During this transitional period, we must deal with the supply-demand gap by conservation and the greater use of abundant energy forms (coal and nuclear).

The GNP-energy-job link:

Because all business activities require energy, the use of energy rises in relation to the rise in Gross National Product. With an estimated 19 million new jobs needed in the next ten years to handle the projected increased work force, either the economy must grow or unemployment will grow. And if new jobs are to be created, a reliable and growing supply of energy is vital. As you may know, a number of national organizations, such as the NAACP National Energy Conference, have recognized this necessity.

The high-growth and no-growth fallacies:

The high-growth scenario is plainly outdated, originating in times of favorable conditions that are unlikely to return again. Yet the no-growth scenario not only would entail massive employment dislocations, but it is profoundly pessimistic as well as selfish, taking a doomsday view of this transitional period between energy epochs. Our energy problems will entail major readjustments for years to come, but such readjustments are surely preferable to the authoritarian control of wages, prices and employment a no-growth scenario would necessitate.

The moderate stance:

The electric utility companies' study suggests generating an average economic growth rate in GNP of between 3.5% and 3.7% a year, which would retain an economy strong enough to sustain employment and preserve our standard of living. Only a vital economy can develop the capital resources necessary to keep our society afloat, including the $650 billion that will be needed in the next 15 years to convert electric plants from oil to the more abundant coal and uranium fuels.

It would be a disservice to the public to suggest that the nation's electric companies, any more than the Congress or the Executive branch, have all the answers. Critical questions remain, and others will surely arise. But as the eminent British biologist Sir Peter Medawar has said, "To deride the hope of progress is the ultimate fatuity, the last word in poverty of spirit and meanness of mind."

Edison Electric Institute
The association of electric companies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

avant-garde. Very few are. The declaration is ritualistic, a part of the magazine's acknowledgment of its lineage among the magazines of the first part of the century." And coming closer to the point (my point if not his), Anania observes, "many magazines reflect a general trend in the society; in America, after all, nostalgia has replaced history."

Many of the new magazines, such as those described in the Coordinating Council announcement, seem to reflect a sensibility that has become commonplace among those in America who have, in some measure, become deracinated, have lost their cultural anchors and are floating free. Uneasy in their isolated freedom, these editors seem to have conjured up a sense of community that is based upon their anguished if not outraged awareness of the unique nature of Their People's sufferings. Of course, such a mystique usually has little to do with the felt life of a particular racial, cultural or religious tradition.

However, even as Anderson and Kinzie write that they "would have preferred [to include] a broader representation of ethnic and minority publications," it does not seem to have occurred to any of the contributors to this collection (except perhaps to Michael Anania) that, though one generation of modern writers managed to climb out of Whittemore's box, another is leaping back in.

The other, related, issue that lurks about the interstices of this anthology can be put as a question, or two questions: Now that "contemporary literature" is taught in every university and junior college in the land, now that "experimental writing" can be merchandised (however unsuccessfully for the moment) on paperback racks and through direct-mail marketing, does the little magazine any longer serve a unique purpose in the education of a literate minority? And is the very idea of an elite culture any longer tenable in American society, or have the distinctions made twenty years ago by Russell Lynes and by Dwight Macdonald (in his seminal essay in *Partisan Review*, "Masscult and Midcult," which is not mentioned in this book), simply disappeared, or been consumed by our voracious culture of novelty? A number of the contributors here edge up to these questions and move them about, but none, I think, offers a more convincing answer than, again, Reed Whittemore: "I think I now know that modernism, though one of the most confused of isms, was at least steady and clear in being a long conspiracy against the middle class." Now that American popular culture with its music, folk heroes and journalism has created its own adversary art which is not only self-supporting but hugely profitable, and now that our middle class has assimilated (or co-opted) much of the serious achievement (as well as much of the nonsense) that validated the franchise of the little magazine, it seems that these peculiar messengers may have lost their mission.

But they will not go away. □

THEATER

HAROLD CLURMAN

A rattling good Broadway *show* at the moment is *Zoot Suit* (Winter Garden). This statement requires explanation. Solely as writing or what is ordinarily called a "play," it has a superficial resemblance to an agitprop script of the 1930s. It certainly is not "literature." But a verbal text on stage is only the seed and scaffolding of the total event as experienced by an audience in the theater. That is the real play. *Zoot Suit* has vitality, raunchy humor, color, pathos and meaning which it derives from the wedding of all the elements that compose it. To judge it from a bare literary viewpoint is to miss its value and pleasure.

On the face of it, it is crude stuff. Its method harks back to the Living Newspaper of the New Deal days. It also employs certain vaudeville and sideshow techniques. There are smatterings of Brecht's "alienation effects." All these —call it a mishmash if you will—nevertheless compose a theatrically vivid unity, mounting to a stirring outcry against racial bigotry and the cruel mass stupidity which such hysteria engenders.

The particular instance of the phenomenon here is the 1942-43 Los Angeles case against seventeen Chicanos accused of killing one of their own who was supposed to be a member of a similar but antagonistic group. There was no evidence to prove the guilt of the indicted youths, but vicious prejudice against poor brown- black- or yellow-skinned people was rife during that period and an adverse verdict was pronounced condemning all the incriminated—and one in particular, Henry Reyna, held to be their leader.

The blatant injustice in the handling of what was called the Sleepy Lagoon murder trial gave rise to the formation of a committee of defense. Carey McWilliams, then-California director of Housing and Immigration and chairman of the defense committee, asserted that this represented "the first well-organized and widely supported effort in Southern California to bring the case of the Mexican, or the citizen of Mexican descent, to the attention of all the peoples of the area."

It must be obvious that, while for men and women of Los Angeles and vicinity the case had an acute local relevance, what is implicit in *Zoot Suit* extends to our country as a whole, indeed to honorable folk the world over. It needs no expert in social observation to notice that an animus against "foreigners" or minorities of every stripe or color is always present everywhere and demands correction in every possible way.

Zoot Suit is now an enormous success in Los Angeles. I am certain that its popularity there is not due to a large attendance of the Chicano population. The majority of the audience at the Mark Taper Forum, where the play was first produced (it is now being presented at the Aquarius Theatre), though near the scene of the original crime, was and perhaps still is to a considerable extent unfamiliar with the various sections of that city inhabited by its minority citizens. What does Hollywood—not to speak of Beverly Hills, Brentwood, Bel-Air, Santa Monica—know of Watts, Boyle Heights and other "submerged" parts of the town where the others dwell? The stimulation of the stage event has awakened the audiences to the guilt of their ignorance. This is a welcome phenomenon, a relief from the kind of sociopolitical lethargy that now dominates the centers of our entertainment business.

Written and vigorously directed by Luis Valdez, the show is the product of a collective effort. Valdez, born in California, is the founder of El Teatro Campesino, a grass-roots organization of and for farm workers. It has performed in the fields and at union meetings, and has evolved into a rousing force such as very few theater associations in our land ever manage to become. Its scope is widening and it is a model of what theater in its beginnings was and what, on a more highly developed level, it should be.

Daniel Valdez, Luis's brother, is not only glowingly virile as Henry Reyna, the victim hero of the story, but acts with the eloquent power of conviction, a full identification with the material. Edward James Olmos is Henry's vengefully cynical alter ego, the evil genius within him wittily and venomously de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Norman Birnbaum, Blair Clark,
Ramsey Clark, Fred Cook, Terrence Des Pres,
E.L. Doctorow, Richard Falk, Jules Feiffer,
Tom Ferguson & Joel Rogers, Frances FitzGerald,
James Goodman & Dorothy Samuels, Philip Green,
Christopher Hitchens, Leonard Kriegel,
Penny Lernoux, Sanford Levinson,
Carey McWilliams, Aryeh Neier, Marcel Ophuls,
Nora Sayre, Robert Sherrill, Calvin Trillin,
Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Alan Wolfe **write it.**

John Alcorn, Marshall Arisman, Tony Auth,
Seymour Chwast, Robert Grossman, Frances Jetter,
Ed Koren, David Levine, Lou Myers, Ed Sorel
illustrate it.

Victor Navasky **edits it.**

We've changed the face of The Nation. The new Nation is something to see.

Why is today's Nation, from editorial to the arts, wiser and wittier than anything in the field? The answer is in the people who write it, illustrate it, and edit it.

Join them. Say "yes" to our enticing offer in the coupon.

The Nation.

333 SIXTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10014

YES! Send me six months (24 issues) of The Nation at the low introductory rate of $9.95. I understand I may cancel at any time and receive a prompt refund for all undelivered copies.

☐ I enclose $9.95. For saving you billing costs I will receive four extra issues free.

☐ Enclosed is $21 for one full year (47 issues).

* Add $3.00 postage for Canada and Mexico; $5 other foreign subscriptions.

Subscriptions payable in equivalent U.S. funds.

Name _____
(please print)

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

2017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nying the possibility of any release from the Chicano inferno through the intervention of the "Anglo" community. Olmos combines a mockingly angular grace of posture and movement with an acid musicality and a flash of Pachuco (1940 zoot suit) style in his role, a sort of "chorus" to the overall spectacle.

There are other bright cast contributions and the whole play bristles with catchy scenic devices—great mounds of newspapers made integral to the setting, the transformation of red pitchforks into prison bars and a general animation, not distinguished as dancing but still enlivening. A sense of energetic optimism pervades the atmosphere and if such a manifestation does not "cure" the evil it aims to combat, it at least serves to remind us of it and cannot fail to leave a distinct mark on our consciousness. *Zoot Suit* has little artistic pretension; it has the spark of primitive theater supported by contemporary technical know-how. It is a shining flare in the Broadway murk.

I saw Alan Ayckbourn's *Bedroom Farce* two years ago at the National Theatre of Britain and reviewed it briefly here. Now at the Brooks Atkinson, with very much the same company, it requires no extended comment: a farce of three representative couples in their "symbolic" bedrooms, it is funny, perfectly cast and very well played.

Ayckbourn both celebrates and joshes the flat silliness and dim amiability of a stale middle-class England. His plays are presumed to have a special satiric bite but I find little sting in them. He is a most adept craftsman, very English in his balance between sly derision and a sort of bored compassion. In this play, the second act, though still replete with laughs, grows a bit tiresome since everything has been said in the first. It nevertheless remains, especially for the English, a jolly good evening in the theater.

The women are all delightful. Susan Littler, adorably innocent, dumb and soundly feminine withal, is my favorite. Delia Lindsay is a beautiful hysteric. Polly Adams adjusts pertly and sensibly to a run-of-the-mill marriage. (The English accommodate themselves wonderfully to mediocrity and even less.) Joan Hickson is expert at the comedy of staunch safety which gives assurance to the slogan, "there will always be an England."

Among the men—all of them right but at moments overacted—Michael Gough as a well-tempered, don't-bother-me Briton of the older generation, is immensely, albeit modestly, effective. □

Crossword Puzzle No. 1770

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 Unknown grades, and a bad thing to be put on, to locate the place. (1,5,3,4)
10 and 11 Look for a safety cover for the sewer, if game for it! (4,3,7)
12 Waving, in the end, might be a happy sign. (7)
13 The Red lost cause of the far-from-young. (7)
14 Lusts, in a hidden way, and attacks the honor. (7)
15 The last word, possibly, when associated with sneaky behavior. (7)
16 Red acting, in a word—that's what it is! (7)
20 How to make a magnate turn purple, almost? (7)
23 Clay found in the open sort should be exhibiting a certain play of colors. (7)
24 One who has a little tiff, as a mud-slinger might? (7)
25 Alcohol? You don't need it to keep them up! (7)
26 One who has pains is getting on—and that's hell! (7)
27 How does one weigh an elephant? It's a matter of degree! (2,1,5,5)

DOWN:

2 Gets by—but a woman doesn't get any younger, either! (7)
3 In case something went wrong the first time, by implication. (7)
4 They're bound to slip on the ice—no wonder his leg's broken! (7)
5 Shows off, as they say, probably with a fairly large roll. (3-4)
6 One of the things some checks and bills tell you not to do. (7)
7 Getting around and around a body is only a small portion in what is spoken. (7)
8 Famous address given perhaps by the President. (A number is really associated with Pennsylvania here.) (3,5,5)
9 Look for anything but peace talks! (Some might say it permits a fuzzy entrance.) (6,7)
17 Mendelssohn's Fourth, so-called. (7)
18 The first letter is not necessarily A. (7)
19 A second one is like a Monday morning QB. (7)
20 Service years? Ay, there's the rub! (7)
21 Pertaining to writing, it's a torn rag with a chip-chop! (7)
22 It's sort of brown up on the mountains—which is quite usual. (7)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1769

ACROSS: 9 Bars; 10 Might; 12, 29 and 1 The Land of the Midnight Sun; 13 Section; 15 Leftists; 16 Sublet; 18 Tandem; 24 Catbird; 26 Dilemma; 28 Busy; 30 Inns; 31 Businessman. DOWN: 2 Insulated; 3 and 21 No man is an island; 4 Gigs; 5 Tatters; 6 Unlit; 7 Mashie; 8 Insole; 14 Essay; 17 Ballerina; 19 Abacus; 20 Marconi; 22 Iciness; 23 and 11 No man's land; 25 Bayou; 27 Stye.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED.

Go National with The Nation's Classifieds: You can reach a large audience of discriminating, educated and concerned readers throughout the United States at very reasonable rates. We charge $3 per line (45 characters or spaces)—two line minimum. Take advantage of our special offer: place an order for three insertions of your ad, and we will print a fourth insertion free! Please enclose payment and send to Lindsey Weinraub c/o The Nation.

BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES

Available, United States public companies, complete price $75,000. Also needed, purchasers or principals for coventures in proven oil, gas and coal properties. E.J.R. Enterprises (Attn: Edward H. Miller, Jr.), Box 87, 46 Jarvis St., Fort Erie, Ontario L2A 5M9. (416) 871-2624.

TRAVEL

SAIL WITH EINSTEIN'S SKIPPER! Cruise Nova Scotia's beautiful coast in 38' ketch. $275/wk. M.R. Haase, Chester, N.S., Canada.

MISCELLANEOUS

YOUR PHOTO on a giant poster, wallet size, 8 x 10 or stamp size. Blk & white or color. Details free. E & B Sales 1682A W. Orangewood, Anaheim, CA 92802.

UNUSUAL GIFTS

'68 Eugene McCarthy campaign button. Send $4.00 & SASE to P.O. Box 645 Duarte Ca. 91010.

EVENTS

National Middle East Conference "Search fo Peace in the Middle East: The New Context." April 27-29, 1979. All Souls' Church, Washington, D.C. A conference on U.S. policy in the Middle East. For information regarding speakers and registration write to: Middle East Programs, American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry Street, Phila. PA 19102.

A Note From the Publisher

A reception supper to honor our Nation Associates will take place on Monday, April 23, at 6 P.M. at The Cooper Union, 7th Street and Third Avenue, New York City.

This event is being held in conjunction with the Cooper Union Forum, which will present a salute to *The Nation* following the reception. The forum will be co-hosted by Hamilton Fish, publisher of *The Nation*, and Henry Alter, director of the Cooper Union Forum, and will include Victor Navasky, editor of *The Nation*, as well as distinguished contributors to the magazine.

The Nation Associates have provided invaluable support to the magazine for more than three decades. We invite subscribers to join the Nation Associates (minimum annual membership of $50 includes a one-year subscription to *The Nation*). Write or phone Claudine Bacher at *The Nation* (212) 242-8400 for further information.

PERIODICALS

access, the bi-weekly journal of media reform is the only publication that covers media reform issues exclusive and in depth. $36 institutions, $24 regular, $18 students. access, 1028 Conn. Ave NW, Washington DC 20036.

URGENT TASKS, theoretical journal of Sojourner Truth Org. Articles on women and capitalism; punk rock; Marx on U.S. slavery; armed movements in Iran and South America (#5); King Tut; fascism; Althussar (#4). $6 subscription; $1.25 back issues; 40% discount 10 or more. STO, P.O. Box 8493, Chicago, Ill. 60680.

READ THE GUARDIAN—newsweekly gives Marxist viewpoint on national and international news. Special 6-week trial subscription, $1. Full year $17. GUARDIAN, Dept. N. 33 West 17th Street, New York City 10011.

PUBLICATIONS

THE CONDOM POEMS by Philip Dacey. $2.00. Ox Head Press, 414 N. 6th, Marshall. MN 56258.

What would a democratic system be like? $5. Center for the Study of Democratic Societies, Box 475N, Manhattan Beach, CA 90266.

Prepare Your Own Will. Kit includes 4 Will forms, 64 page booklet by an attorney, a Family Assets form and one outlining the Executor's duties. $4.00. Norgena, Dept. N, Box 197, Bklyn, N.Y. 11205.

What have you got to lose? 10 lbs? 20 lbs? More? Incredible new diet. Lose a pound a day. Easy. Safe. Send $2 to: Superdiet, Downstairs, 166 West 21 St., N.Y., N.Y. 10011.

From the author of Women, Sex and Race, a new book! **Sexual, Racial and Political Faces of Corruption** by Bernard Braxton. With many accounts: from sexual exploitation and incest of Pope Alexander VI, sexism and racism in churches to rape, official sex harassment, sexual exploitation in the U.S. Congress and government departments. 280 pages. Clothbound, $8.95; paperback, $3.54. Postpaid. Verta Press, 15 Randolph Place NW, Washington, D.C. 20001.

LEO STRAUSS issue—$10.50: **Independent Journal of Philosophy.** Cobenzlgasse 13/4, A1190 Vienna, Austria. T.N.

BOOKS

WELCOME TO THE WORLD OF BOOK AUCTIONS. Bid by mail or attend. Sample catalog free. Mention subject interests. LAZY DAY GALLERIES, 26 E. Mt. Pleasant Ave., Livingston, NJ 07039.

PERSONALS

Masterful Gentleman, 40s, seeks a very special young woman with acquiescent inclinations to share fantasies, sensuality and permanency. Reply Nation Box 900.

SINGLE BOOKLOVERS gets cultured, single, widowed or divorced acquainted. Est. 1970. Nationwide. Box AE, Swarthmore, PA 19081.

RECORDS & TAPES

Records, tapes & books by, for and about WOMEN. Hundreds available. Poetry, prose, plays, speeches and music. FREE catalogue. WOMEN'S AUDIO EXCHANGE, BOX 273, Cambridge, N.Y. 12816.

FREE PROMOTIONAL ALBUMS: Concert tickets, stereos, etc. Info: Barry Publications. 477A 92nd Street, Brooklyn, NY 11209.

SERVICES

BECOME LEGALLY ORDAINED MINISTER. Credentials sent for $3 offering. Mother Earth Church. Dept. NA. 469 Pacific. Monterey. CA 93940

RENT-AN-ARTIST: Illustration, design, layout, paste-up, mechanical. Rush Service in NYC. 243-0532 or Nation Box 93.

Last will and testament. Blank will form drafted by licensed attorney. Only $2. Order today. Box 6572, Columbus, Ga. 31907.

MUSICAL INSTRUCTION

VOICE LESSONS - Experienced teacher: B.F.A., M.M., Fulbright scholar. 212-877-9161

ASSOCIATIONS

CORPUS—National Association Resigned/Married Priests; Box 2649; Chicago, IL 60690.

WINES & LIQUORS

Save Money! Create your own liqueurs and cordials. No distilling or fermenting. Make in your kitchen. Recipes-Instructions only $3.95 ppd. E & B Sales 1682A Orangewood, Anaheim, CA 92802.

Become a wine expert, in just a few issues of WINE, the most authoritative wine magazine (64 pages with color). Send $9.00 for year, or $1.00 sample issue ot Les Amis du Vin. 2302 Perkins Place, Silver Spring, MD 20910.

MERCHANDISE

FREE CATALOG! SAVE UP TO 50% on famous name calculators, typewriters, phone answer units. Victor, Sharp, Sanyo, Royal, Code-A-Phone etc. Write: Executive, NA1, Box 65, S.O. NJ 07079.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Hawaii—How To Get A Job: Men/Women ... rush $5: Clothe The Naked—TN Box 27984, Honolulu 96827.

WORK IN JAPAN! No experience, degree, or Japanese required. Teach English conversation. Send long, stamped, self-addressed envelope for details. Japan-11, P.O. Box 33, Centralia, WA. 98531.

RECIPES

Claudine's Chewy Chip Bars. All done in one pan—no bowls etc. Send $1.00 and S.A.S.E. to The Nation Box 980.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRIBUTE TO
HAROLD CLURMAN

SUNDAY MAY 6 at 8PM • 412 West 42nd Street

AARON COPLAND, Chairman
Co-Chairpersons

Lilly Auchincloss • Richard Clurman • Brendan Gill • Mrs. Laura Johnson • Dr. & Mrs. Henry A. Kissinger
Bess Myerson • Mrs. Jacqueline Onassis • Mrs. Gil Shiva • Roger L. Stevens • Robert Whitehead

APPEARING (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

AARON COPLAND • JULIE HARRIS • ELIA KAZAN
WALTER MATTHAU • ARTHUR MILLER • MAUREEN STAPLETON
ROBERT WHITEHEAD and BETTY COMDEN & ADOLPH GREEN
and
HAROLD CLURMAN

Tickets $125
(All proceeds benefit the Harold Clurman Theatre Production Fund and are tax deductible). For information call: (212) 874-2390

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED